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300 GOVERNMENTS: UNDERSTANDING INTERMUNICIPAL 
COLLABORATION IN NASSAU COUNTY, NY AND POLICIES OF 
“FORCED EFFICIENCY” IN NEW YORK STATE 
Daniel Chase Fishbein* 
INTRODUCTION 
On the eastern seaboard of the United States, where 
the state of New York wedges itself between New Jer-
sey and Connecticut, explorers of political affairs can 
observe one of the great unnatural wonders of the 
world: that is, a government arrangement perhaps 
more complicated than any other that mankind has yet 
contrived or allowed to happen.1 
In 1960, the Harvard Public Policy School (now the Harvard Kenne-
dy School of Government) produced a book series detailing “a 22-
county expanse” that it called the “New York Metropolitan Region.”2  
 
* J.D. Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2015.  An earlier version of this article was 
submitted to Northwestern’s Owen L. Coon/James A. Rahl Senior Research Program. The 
inspiration for this article came from my experience volunteering on Tom Suozzi’s campaign 
for Nassau County Executive in 2013.  I fully disclose my affiliation with the Nassau County 
Democratic Party.  Since June 2009, I have participated in the county’s political scene in dif-
ferent capacities: as an intern to Democratic Counsel’s Office in the County Legislature, as 
Executive Director to the Town of Oyster Bay Democratic Committee, and a short stint as an 
employee of the County Board of Elections leading up to my departure for law school. I 
would like to thank Professors Nadav Shoked and Steven Elrod for their exhaustive edits and 
comments. I would also like to thank Matthew Hettrich, Lauren Wittlin, and the rest of the 
editors of the Touro Law Review in preparing this article for publication. Lastly, I would 
like to give a special thanks to Dave Gugerty, for without him this article would not be pos-
sible. All errors are my own. 
1 ROBERT C. WOOD & VLADIMIR V. ALMENDINGER, 1400 GOVERNMENTS: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE NEW YORK METROPOLITAN REGION 1 (1961). 
2 Id.  The 22 counties studied by Wood and Almendinger were: Hudson, Essex, Union, 
Passaic, Bergen, Monmouth, Middlesex, Somerset, and Morris in New Jersey, and Nassau, 
Suffolk, Westchester, Rockland, Orange, Putnam, Dutchess, and the five city boroughs in 
New York. Fairfield County in Connecticut was studied as well. 
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The nine-part study was written at the behest of the Regional Plan 
Association, a nonprofit agency that sought to promote coordinated 
development of the region and has done so for over ninety years.3  
The eighth book, 1400 Governments, took an in-depth look at the re-
gion’s decentralized municipal government structure.4  Aptly titled, 
author Robert C. Wood with the assistance of Vladimir V. Al-
mendinger set out to explain the political economy of twenty-two 
suburban counties that governed themselves “by means of 1467 dis-
tinct political entities [at their latest count in 1960], each having its 
own power to raise and spend the public treasure, and each operating 
in a jurisdiction determined more by chance then design.”5 
Throughout the New York Metropolitan region, towns, vil-
lages, and special districts provide the majority of municipal services.  
Special districts, also known as special improvement districts or spe-
cial taxing districts, are independent municipal entities that carry out 
government services ranging anywhere from sanitation to schooling.6  
In Nassau County alone there are over 300 separate units of govern-
ment—at least 179 of those being special districts (and more, depend-
ing how you count it)7—a pernicious total given that each unit oper-
ates with great autonomy and the ability to tax homeowners for the 
services it provides.8 
Initially chartered in 1899, Nassau County was partitioned 
 
3 Id.  For the Regional Plan Association’s 90-year history see REG’L PLAN ASS’N, 
http://www.rpa.org (last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
4 WOOD & ALMENDINGER, supra note 1, at 1. 
5 WOOD & ALMENDINGER, supra note 1, at 1. 
6 See Nadav Shoked, Quasi Cities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971, 1973 (2013).  While the exact 
definition of a special district is rather unsettled, Professor Shoked—drawing on the history 
of special districts and Supreme Court precedent—recommends that the technical definition 
of special district be “[a] [g]overnment [l]acking [p]owers of [r]egulation [b]eyond [i]ts 
[f]acilities.” Id. at 1997-99. 
7 Calculating the total number of government units varies depending on how a municipal 
entity is defined.  The total number of municipal entities within a larger regional jurisdiction 
is important to the overall discussion about the size and scope of municipal government. See 
Erika Rosenberg, Who Provides Services on Long Island?, LONG ISLAND INDEX (June 2012), 
http://www.longislandindexmaps.org/newsmedia/Who_Provides_Services_on_Long_Island.
pdf.  The Long Island Index, a nonprofit group, puts the total number of governmental units 
at 336, while the Long Island Regional Planning Council, an intergovernmental relations 
council, puts that number at 305. Long Island Index, 2012 Profile Report, LONG ISLAND 
INDEX (2012), http://www.longislandindex.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/LI_Profile_2012.pdf; Sustainable Strategies for Long Island 2035, 
LONG ISLAND REG’L PLANNING COUNCIL (Dec. 2010), http://www.lirpc.org/3.2010-12-
02_LI2035StrategiesReport.pdf. 
8 Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 3; see also Shoked, supra note 6, at 1973. 
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from Queens County as its residents stood in opposition to New York 
City annexing Long Island out east.9  Growing over time to a popula-
tion of 1.3 million, Nassau has further divided into three townships—
Hempstead, North Hempstead, and Oyster Bay—and two cities—
Long Beach and Glen Cove.10  Like their sisters in the Metropolitan 
Region, those cities are still further divided into 53 hamlets and 64 
incorporated villages.  While that might seem overly complex in and 
of itself, services provided through separate special districts don’t 
necessarily conform to local government’s traditional vertical struc-
ture of county—town or city—village or hamlet—special district.  
Often instead special districts have their own unique jurisdictional 
lines, creating a “crazy quilt”11 as to how residents receive their sani-
tation, fire, water, library, and school services.  Just look at this map 
showing the lack of uniform jurisdictional lines for different services 
in any particular area:12  
 
9 Keith Williams, How Queens Became New York City’s Largest Borough, CURBED NY 
(Oct. 20, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://ny.curbed.com/2015/10/20/9912148/how-queens-became-
new-york-citys-largest-borough. 
10 Quick Facts Nassau County, New York, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2016). 
11 The term “crazy quilt” has been used to describe a web of special districts for some 
time. See TEARFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, infra note 52, at 2; THOMAS R. SUOZZI, SPECIAL 
DISTRICT ELECTION DATE STUDY: A CRAZY QUILT (2007) (using the term “crazy quilt” in the 
title of a county report). 
12 Nassau County Multi-Jurisdictional Map: Existing Conditions, NASSAU CNTY. PLAN. 
COMM’N, http://www.fixmypropertytaxes.com/map-zoom-special-districts-nassau-county 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2016). 
3
Fishbein: 300 Governments
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
538 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
 
History has shown that Nassau’s residents like their special dis-
tricts providing decentralized government services.13  In defending so 
many local governments, residents often talk about the benefits of 
more personalized service.14  Some public choice theorists believe 
that because there are so many varying hyper-local options, residents 
are better able to choose the level of government services they are 
willing to pay for.15 
But having so many municipal units can come at the cost of 
larger tax bills because service providers lack economy of scale and 
sometimes lack sufficient expertise and professionalization in service 
delivery—considerations that residents don’t necessarily take into ac-
count when voting and government officials don’t necessarily take 
into account when developing public policy.  And in Nassau County, 
existing boundary lines for municipal units in the county were often 
drawn taking race and socio-economic standing heavily into ac-
 
13 See discussion infra Part I. 
14 See, e.g., Plainview Water Commissioner Andrew Bader.  I interviewed Mr. Bader for 
this project and thank him for his time.  He is known throughout the community and he is 
passionate about delivering quality water to the community.  In fact, Plainview won a com-
petition in 2012 for the best drinking water in Nassau.  Joe Dowd, Plainview's Water Voted 
Best in Nassau: the Water District's H2O Now Takes on Suffolk for the Title of this Year's 
Champ, PLAINVIEW PATCH (May 11, 2012, 10:25 PM), http://patch.com/new-
york/plainview/plainview-s-water-voted-best-in-nassau.  Mr. Bader prides himself in the fact 
that when the water isn’t working—a water main break, Superstorm Sandy or a snow 
storm—people in the community know exactly who to call. 
15 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
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count—a factor that has significantly contributed to a continued pat-
tern of high concentration poverty in many of Nassau’s African 
American and Latino communities today.16 
Nassau was at a time a model for the nation.  But while the 
county is still a great place to live with one of the highest standards of 
living in the nation,17 only 40 percent of Long Island residents think 
Nassau is headed in the right direction.18  This might be because alt-
hough residents on average have high incomes, they pay one of the 
highest median property tax rates as a percentage of income in the 
country.19  Nassau’s job growth is stagnant.20  Its population is aging 
while its younger population is leaving.21  Its overall cost of housing 
as a percentage of income is substantially higher than its peers,22 but 
produces few new homes.23  Nassau’s infrastructure is deteriorating, 
with plans to replace it often being frustrated by intractable zoning 
processes.24  And high concentration of low-income communities—
 
16 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
17 In 2011, Nassau according to U.S. Census data ranked twelfth in median household in-
come at $94,414. Highest Income Counties in the Nation, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/local/highest-income-counties/. 
18 Long Island Index 2012 Profile Report (2012), LONG ISLAND INDEX, 
http://www.longislandindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/LI_Profile_2012.pdf. 
19 MCMAHON, infra note 240, at 5.  Nassau is ranked second in the nation for median 
property taxes paid at $8,940 per household and fifth in property taxes as a percentage of 
income at 8.56 percent. MCMAHON, infra note 240, at 5. 
20  LONG ISLAND INDEX, 2012 Profile Report, supra note 18, at 2. 
21  LONG ISLAND INDEX, 2012 Profile Report, supra note 18, at 2.  Nassau’s Baby Boomer 
population is aging, while their millennial children appear to be leaving Long Island, in part 
possibly due to the high cost of housing.  LONG ISLAND INDEX, 2012 Profile Report, supra 
note 18, at 7.  Nassau and Suffolk’s young adult population, ages 25-34, has shrunk by 
twelve percent between the 2000 and 2010 census. 
22  LONG ISLAND INDEX, 2012 Profile Report, supra note 18, at 7. 
[T]he share of household income that 25-34-year-olds spend on housing 
is higher than in any other part of the region. On Long Island, 43% in 
this age group pay more than 35% of their income for housing, com-
pared to 37% in New York City and 38% in other suburban parts of the 
region. 
LONG ISLAND INDEX, 2012 Profile Report, supra note 18, at 7.  That statistic is also alarm-
ingly high across all age groups at 38% in 2010. Nassau also has an incredibly low rental 
stock. “[O]nly 21% of housing units are rentals on the Island compared to 35% in Westches-
ter and southwestern Connecticut and 37% in northern New Jersey.” LONG ISLAND INDEX, 
2012 Profile Report, supra note 18, at 7. 
23  LONG ISLAND INDEX, 2012 Profile Report, supra note 18, at 13. (“In the last decade, 
there were 16 residential building permits issued for each 1,000 residents of Nassau and Suf-
folk.  By comparison, there were 25 permits issued for every 1,000 residents of southwestern 
Connecticut, 27 in the Hudson Valley and 31 in northern New Jersey.”). 
24  LONG ISLAND INDEX, 2012 Profile Report, supra note 18, at 14; see, e.g., Editorial Op., 
5
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overwhelmingly minority—continues to be a challenge to over-
come.25  To top it off, the county’s finances in 2010 were brought in-
to state receivership, making it even more difficult to alleviate these 
issues.26 
Nassau is not the only county in New York State facing finan-
cial difficulty.  Westchester and Suffolk Counties also have precari-
ously high property taxes as a percentage of income.27  For that mat-
ter, Suffolk County is having deficit problems of its own.28  But the 
bottom line is that Nassau was built for the 20th century and has 
struggled to adapt in the 21st, while its peer counties outside of New 
York like Fairfax in Northern Virginia are thriving.29 
Many attribute Nassau County’s struggles in part to its glut of 
governmental units.  Critics point rightly to the lack of economy of 
scale.  But they also highlight incidents of districts operating ineffi-
ciently with bloated salaries for employees—often under the radar 
screen and out of the public prevue.30  Critics have also attributed the 
lack of streamlined government as a barrier to new development.  
The most glaring incident: The County’s failure to persuade the 
Town of Hempstead to make necessary zoning changes for new de-
velopment around the Nassau Coliseum, known as the Lighthouse 
Project.31  The Town of Hempstead’s refusal to change the zoning 
 
Oyster Bay Running Behind Even the LIRR, NEWSDAY (Feb. 24, 2015, 5:33 PM), 
http://www.newsday.com/opinion/editorial/oyster-bay-running-behind-even-the-lirr-
editorial-1.9972810 (discussing the lost opportunity to revitalize community after major in-
frastructure improvement). 
25  LONG ISLAND INDEX, 2012 Profile Report, supra note 18, at 4. 
26 See discussion infra Parts I.B., E. 
27 MCMAHON, infra note 240, at 5.  Westchester County residents pay even higher proper-
ty taxes than Nassau residents at a median of $9,044 ranking first in the nation.  The county 
also ranks 7th in property taxes as a percentage of income at 8.24 percent.  Suffolk County 
for that matter also ranks high in median taxes at 11th with a median of $7,361.  Its property 
tax rate as a percentage of income ranks just below Suffolk’s at 8th in the nation with a rate 
of 7.98 percent. MCMAHON, infra note 240, at 6. 
28 Rick Brand, Suffolk Shortfall Could Hit $170 Million in 2015, NEWSDAY (Apr. 22, 
2014, 10:43 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/suffolk/suffolk-shortfall-could-hit-
170-million-in-2015-1.7794780. 
29 Susan Weaver, Large Community Case Study: Rosslyn-Ballston Corridor, Arlington, 
Virginia, LONG ISLAND INDEX (Jan. 2011), http://www.longislandindex.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/Case_Study_Rosslyn-Ballston_Corridor.pdf. 
30 Sandra Peddie, Special Districts: Big Salaries, Little Oversight, NEWSDAY (Dec. 15, 
2007 11:23 AM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/special-districts-big-salaries-little-
oversight-1.877177. 
31 Randi F. Marshall, Hempstead Town Plan Cuts Lighthouse Project in Half, NEWSDAY 
(July 12, 2010), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/hempstead-town-plan-cuts-
lighthouse-project-in-half-1.2096669. 
6
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ordinance was a significant factor in causing the New York Islanders 
to move west to Brooklyn.32 
Although the outlook appears bleak, there have long been pro-
ponents for reform.  The most recent advocates came in 2001 when 
Tom Suozzi and Howard Weitzman were elected Nassau County Ex-
ecutive and Comptroller.  During their tenure in office, they along 
with the state’s top officials—Governors Spitzer, Paterson and Cuo-
mo and Comptroller Di Napoli—actively campaigned and promoted 
local government reform.33  The collective efforts across the state led 
to two legislative accomplishments: the New N.Y. Government Re-
organization And Citizen Empowerment Act, and the New York 
State Property Tax Cap. 
The Reorganization and Citizen Empowerment Act, passed by 
the state legislature in 2009, reformed New York’s procedures for 
consolidation and dissolution of local government units.34  Consoli-
dation of local governments occurs when two government units 
merge together, and dissolution occurs when a government unit is 
terminated and ceases to exist.35 
On the revenues side, the property tax cap limits municipalities’ 
abilities to increase their budgets.  The cap places a constraint on lo-
cal property taxes by which local lawmakers could only increase tax 
levies by either two percent or a rate of inflation formula.36  Local 
legislative bodies can “pierce” the cap, but at the intended cost of a 
 
32 See Joseph Berger, Developer Wins Approval to Renovate Nassau Coliseum, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/24/nyregion/developer-wins-
approval-to-renovate-nassau-coliseum.html?_r=0; David M. Halbfinger, Fiscal Worries 
Fueled Defeat of Arena Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/nyregion/nassau-coliseum-vote-reflected-anger-over-
debt-limit.html; Marshall, Hempstead Town Plan Cuts Lighthouse Project in Half, supra 
note 31.  In 2009 County Executive Suozzi and New York Islanders owner Charles proposed 
the “Lighthouse Project” to renovate the Nassau Coliseum and its surrounding area.  Town 
of Hempstead Supervisor Kate Murray, a Republican, stood in staunch opposition.  Although 
Suozzi was the County Executive, Murray had significant power because the town, not the 
county, controlled the zoning of the area, which ironically was county-owned property. 
33 See infra, Part I.B-E.  Governor Cuomo, like Suozzi and Weitzman, has also been a 
steadfast proponent of special district reform.  Cuomo has campaigned on it in both of his 
gubernatorial elections, even running a television ad dedicated to the issue. 
34 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §§ 750-93 (McKinney 2016). 
35 Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1367 (2012). 
36 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 3-c; Thomas Kaplan, Upset at Cuomo’s Property-Tax Cap, 
Communities Move to Get Around It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/nyregion/cuomo-cap-on-property-taxes-rankles-
communities.html?_r=0; See infra Part II.D (discussing lower transactions costs of inter-
municipal activities). 
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painful vote approving an increase by at least 60 percent and only for 
that given year.37  Passed in 2011, the property tax cap has been con-
sidered among many in New York’s political class a success in rein-
ing in local government tax levies.38 
In 2014, building on the property tax cap, Governor Cuomo 
signed into law another local government reform entitled the property 
tax freeze.  This two-year tax credit program reimburses homeowners 
who qualify under New York State’s STAR tax credit program in-
tended for low, middle-income, and upper-middle income families.39  
In the program’s first year, qualifying homeowners receive a tax 
credit if their local government unit stays within the tax cap.40  
Homeowners receive a tax credit in the program’s second year if their 
local government unit stays within the cap and also “implement[s] a 
Government Efficiency Plan to reduce costs by consolidating ser-
vices” or collaborating with other municipalities.41 
Intermunicipal coordination, or collaboration, occurs when mu-
nicipalities engage with each other to perform services or jointly pur-
chase together in order to provide cost savings, economy of scale, 
and improved service delivery for their constituents.42  While munic-
ipalities have duties and obligations to perform services, under state 
law they can share the burden with others by engaging in intermunic-
ipal agreements and by participating in shared service organiza-
tions.43  Over the decade Nassau has seen increasing collaboration, 
especially in the wake of the great recession. 
Many see the property tax cap combined with collaboration and 
consolidation as symbiotic policies toward the larger goal of reducing 
 
37 N.Y. GEN. MUN. Law § 3-c(5). 
38 Yancey Roy, Report: LI School-Tax Growth Rate Plummets Since Tax Cap Enacted, 
NEWSDAY (May 19, 2015, 7:17 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/politics/spin-
cycle/report-li-school-tax-growth-rate-plummets-since-tax-cap-enacted-1.10450699. 
39 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 606; see also infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the property tax freeze). 
40 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 3-d; see infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the property tax freeze). 
41 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 3-d; OFFICE OF GOV. ANDREW M. CUOMO, THE NEW YORK 
STATE PROPERTY TAX CAP: RESULTS. SUCCESS. SAVINGS. (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/PropertyTaxCap.pdf; 
Michael Gormley, New Yorkers to see Property Tax Breaks Under State Budget Deal, 
NEWSDAY (Mar. 29, 2014, 12:55 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/politics/spin-
cycle/new-yorkers-to-see-property-tax-breaks-under-state-budget-deal-1.7544496; see infra 
Part III. 
42 See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o; see infra Part II.B. 
43 See infra Part II.B. 
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the tax bill for local governments.44  Local lawmakers would be 
forced to interact with each other with a tangible constraint of the 
property tax cap and tax freeze in the background. Local govern-
ments have taken notice.  In 2014 the New York School Board Asso-
ciation, Association of Towns, Conference of Mayors and Municipal 
Officials, and Association of Counties met for a summit for “Munici-
pal Innovation And Exchange” entitled: “Grace Under Pressure: In-
novation In A Time Of Force Efficiencies.”45  As the conference’s 
name suggests, these associations sought to exchange ideas on inter-
municipal coordination in a time when local governments faced in-
creasing fiscal stress, in part due to the property tax cap and desired 
tax credit from the freeze.46 
However, while governments have felt pressure and have been 
more inclined to collaborate as a result, residents haven’t felt the 
pressure to consolidate.  Even though the Reorganization and Citizen 
Empowerment Act was heralded as an achievement in reducing the 
barriers to implementing consolidation—such as easier signature re-
quirements for plebiscites—very few districts have actually been 
consolidated or dissolved under the new law.47 
Politicians who used to champion consolidation have also 
changed tactics after seeing the lack of success after passage of the 
new law.  Tom Suozzi advocated for consolidation during his first 
two terms in office.48  But when he ran for reelection for his old seat 
in 2013, he campaigned on a different platform for local government 
reform: that special districts should instead collaborate in order to de-
liver more cost effective services because consolidation is “just never 
going to happen.”49 
Suozzi’s shift from consolidation to collaboration was a prag-
matic policy shift and one that other politicians and policy makers 
should follow.  In this Article, I make the case that Nassau County 
can solve its special district problem through intermunicipal collabo-
 
44 See infra Part III.B. 
45 Brochure, Mun. Innovation Exch. Summit, Grace under Pressure: Innov. In a Time of 
Force Efficiencies (Apr. 25, 2014), 
http://www.nyssba.org/clientuploads/nyssba_pdf/ebrochure-summit-041614.pdf. 
46 Id. 
47 See infra Part II.A and note 176. 
48 Dan Janson, Suozzi Goes for 'Collaboration' Over 'Consolidation', NEWSDAY (Aug. 18, 
2013 6:04 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/columnists/dan-janison/suozzi-goes-
for-collaboration-over-consolidation-1.5913736 
49 Id.; see infra Part I.E. 
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ration, using a range of tools that the state and its local governments 
have created toward furthering local government reform.  I also track 
the state’s lawmakers’ newfound movement toward “forced efficien-
cy” of local governments, and argue that while forced efficiency may 
indeed induce collaboration, forced efficiency and incentive policies 
should be tailored to better achieve equity aims. 
In Part I of this Article, I give a brief history of special districts 
in Nassau County, tracking its early history and Suozzi’s tenure in of-
fice, as well as the recently passed local government reforms in the 
state.  In Part II, I give a survey of intermunicipal law in New York 
State, showing that although the Reorganization And Citizen Em-
powerment Act has certainly reformed consolidation and dissolution 
procedures, it is still a cumbersome process compared to collabora-
tion.  In addition, I also survey the property tax cap, property tax 
freeze, and grants incentivizing intermunicipal activity.  In Part III.A, 
I discuss the scholarship around new regionalist paradigms and argue 
that new regionalist paradigms, despite their detractors, can still 
achieve equity aims and, therefore, should be preferable to policy-
makers because of collaboration’s political viability compared to 
consolidation and dissolution models.  In Part III.B, I discuss Profes-
sor Michelle Anderson’s “[f]aces of [m]unicipal [d]issolution” and 
make the case that those themes are also applicable to intermunicipal 
collaboration.  I also make the case that “forced efficiency” is a new 
theme for intermunicipal activity and should be included in the aca-
demic discussion. 
Lastly in Part IV, I outline the toolbox available to fix Nassau’s 
special district problem in order to achieve both efficiency and equity 
aims.  In Part IV.A, I make the case that cost disparities and ineffi-
ciencies in municipal spending are real and collaboration can produce 
meaningful cost-savings.  Next, I demonstrate with polling data from 
Tom Suozzi’s 2013 campaign that collaboration is a politically viable 
policy platform, while consolidation is not—at least at the plebiscite 
stage.  In Part IV.B, I argue that although “forced efficiency” is likely 
to be a factor for municipalities in the years to come, collaborative 
centric policies should not be tied to “force efficiency” devices, such 
as the property tax cap, because such all-or-nothing policies can im-
pede equity goals.  Instead, I argue that while collaborative centric 
incentive policies tethered to the tax cap can avoid rent-seeking be-
havior on the part of local officials, those policies should also have 
alternative forms of qualifying criteria to incentivize collaboration 
10
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with high concentration poverty and low-assessment municipalities.  
Lastly, in Parts IV.C-E, I outlay how grants, local government educa-
tion programs and local offices of intermunicipal coordination are all 
low cost methods toward lowering transaction costs and information 
asymmetries to better facilitate collaboration among municipalities. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN NASSAU 
COUNTY 
While perhaps an “unnatural wonder,” Nassau County’s for-
mation from a “Rural Hinterland to Suburban Metropolis”50 is a rich 
history in suburban development.  Home to the first Post-War large-
scale planned community of Levittown, Nassau was considered the 
model for the nation during the middle of the twentieth century.51  
Importantly, Nassau’s layers of governments and improvement dis-
tricts have played a principal role in its narrative.52 
 
50 JOANN P. KRIEG & NATALIE A. NAYLOR, NASSAU COUNTY: FROM RURAL HINTERLAND 
TO SUBURBAN METROPOLIS (2000). 
51 Levittown, New York was a planned subdivision built by its namesake William Levitt. 
Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural Modernism, Post-
Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 782 (1993).  A 
true visionary, Levitt built the community in an assembly-line style, meeting the post-war 
housing shortage demand of the mid-twentieth century. Id.  In total Levitt built over seven-
teen thousand single story “Cape Cods,” and 800-square foot “ranch homes.” Corey Kil-
gannon, Change Blurs Memories in a Famous Suburb, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/13/nyregion/13suburb.html.  Because of its success as the 
“earliest large-scale suburban housing development in Post WWII America,” Levittown has 
been regarded as an “archetypical suburban community,” not only receiving its own Smith-
sonian exhibit, but in fact the Smithsonian has gone so far as to try and buy one of the last 
remaining Levitt houses. Id.; see Levittown, New York, Is Fifty Years Old, SMITHSONIAN, 
http://www.si.edu/Exhibitions/Details/Levittown-New-York-Is-Fifty-Years-Old-4183 (last 
visited Mar. 6 2015) (“50th anniversary of Levittown” exhibition held from Dec. 3, 1997 – 
Mar. 31, 1998); Note, Locating the Suburb, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2011 (2004).  Howev-
er, Levittown was not ideal for everyone.  William Levitt built the development in accord-
ance with FHA housing policies that gave incentive to build segregated communities. Kevin 
Fox Gotham, Racialization and the State: The Housing Act of 1934 and the Creation of the 
Federal Housing Administration, 43 SOC. PERSP. 291, 308-10 (2000) (citation omitted) 
(“[T]he FHA not only sanctioned racial discrimination in the housing industry but also fos-
tered the development of large ‘community builders’ who specialized in assembling huge 
tracts of vacant suburban land for lot sales and uniform home construction on a large 
scale.”).  According to Gotham, “As late as 1960, not one of Levittown's 82,000 residents 
was African American.” Id. at 309. 
52 For a much more expansive history on Long Island’s development read JON C. 
TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS ON THE EDGE CITIES 1-3 (1997) 
[hereinafter TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA]. 
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A. “Keep the Tammany Tiger out of Nassau”53 
Understanding Nassau’s web of municipalities requires a short 
stop at Tammany Hall.54  The infamous fine-tuned political machine 
of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries pervaded all aspects of 
city life until the Great Depression.55  Tammany Hall has been 
marked as an “unenviable place” in America’s history as a hot bed of 
corruption.56  And while certainly true, the loathing of the institution 
is probably better explained by Tammany’s roots with the Irish-
American community and the larger immigrant community taking 
hold in the boroughs as they left Elis Island.57  During this period 
New York City saw a rapid population spike, increasing from a little 
more than 60,000 people in 1800 to over 3.4 million by 1900, and 
booming to more than 6.9 million by 1930.58  A substantial percent-
age of the population spike consisted of immigrants heading west, 
who found Tammany as an “ally” in an alien city.59 
With these structural changes to the city’s demographics and its 
political institutions, people of means headed out to the “gold coast” 
of Long Island in the 1920s and 1930s.60  But while city folk migrat-
ed east, New York City was also thinking outward as well.  From the 
mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century New York City 
sought rapid annexation beyond its Manhattan confines in an effort to 
outpace its rival cities like Chicago and Philadelphia, increasing its 
 
53 There are many iterations of this line, especially in Teaford’s literature. Jon C. Teaford, 
Nassau County: A Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, in NASSAU COUNTY: FROM RURAL 
HINTERLAND TO SUBURBAN METROPOLIS 26 (Joann P. Krieg & Natalie A. Naylor eds. 2000) 
[hereinafter Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier].  But I attribute this particular ren-
dition to Tom Suozzi when I first approached him about this project. 
54 WOOD & ALMENDINGER, supra note 1, at 5. 
55 WOOD & ALMENDINGER, supra note 1, at 9.  The Tammany Hall machine ultimately 
came to an end with the election of Fiorello La Guardia, ushering in a new chapter for the 
city that was dealing with the Great Depression. Tammany Hall, HISTORY.COM, 
http://www.history.com/topics/tammany-hall (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
56 TERRY GOLWAY, MACHINE MADE, TAMMANY HALL AND THE CREATION OF MODERN 
POLITICS  xvii (2014). 
57 Id. at xvii-xviii (“Tammany, at its worst, certainly was guilty of many of the charges 
arrayed against it.  But the accusations of political and moral corruption were often linked to 
a profound bigotry rooted in a transatlantic . . . .”). 
58 Total and Foreign-born Population: New York City, 1790-2000, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITY 
PLAN., http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/data-maps/nyc-
population/historical-population/1790-2000_nyc_total_foreign_birth.pdf (last visited Apr. 
10, 2016). 
59 GOLWAY, supra note 56, at xvii. 
60 See TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 11-12. 
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city limits “from 44 to 299 square miles” by 1898.61  Proponents of 
annexation, such as the residents of Queens County, favored expan-
sion of the city’s limits because of the potential for improved services 
that City Hall could provide.62  But while Queens welcomed annexa-
tion, the people of Nassau County stood in opposition. 
Thus, during the first half of the twentieth century, Nassau’s 
population rapidly expanded with hundreds of thousands flocking 
east.63  Nassau’s population rose from a little more than 45,000 in 
1890, to over 600,000 in 1950 and more than 1.3 million by 1960.64  
But the population influx in such a short span meant that suburban 
governments, threatened by overpopulation, tailored themselves to 
maintain their “exclusivity.”65  And so the strategy adopted by mu-
nicipal governments was to use incorporation as a “protective de-
vice,” designed to shield residents against unwanted development.66  
According to suburban historian Jon Teaford, “in 1920 there were on-
ly twenty village or city governments in Nassau . . . .”67  But by 1930 
there were forty-seven, and by the mid 1930s there were “sixty-five 
villages and cities” as well as “173 special districts.”68  Even as early 
as the 1930s, a government survey reported: “There are so many local 
jurisdictions that it was not possible to prepare a map of the county or 
even of one town showing local unit boundaries.”69 
That said, not all residents supported decentralized local gov-
ernment.  In 1914, a good-government group called the Nassau Coun-
ty Association, lobbied to correct these problems attributed to home 
rule.70  Through their efforts, the group won a vote in the state legis-
 
61 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 27-28. 
62 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 28-29. 
63 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 30 (citing U.S. census 
data). 
64 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 30. 
65 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 28-31. 
66 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 31.  Reasons for protect-
ing incorporation were not always the same.  For example, aristocratic communities on the 
North Shore of Long Island, such as “Saddle Rock, Centre Island, Old Brookville, and Old 
Westbury,” sought to avoid new development around their estates and maintain their low-
density profiles, while other rationales might have been less aesthetic and more financially 
motivated. Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 31 
67 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 31 
68 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, 31-32. 
69 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 32-33. (citing THOMAS H 
REED, THE GOVERNMENT OF NASSAU COUNTY 4, 58 (1934)). 
70 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 33. 
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lature for the creation of a commission to propose reforms.71  In 
1918, that commission called for “greater centralization and respon-
sibility of authority,” to eliminate the inefficiencies of so many small 
and overlapping government units.72 
While the commission’s proposed reforms ultimately were not 
adopted, its progress dovetailed into a 1921 state constitutional 
amendment that allowed Nassau and Westchester Counties to create 
new forms of government with centralized features.73  The amend-
ment passed statewide—even with a slim majority in Nassau.74  Nev-
ertheless, Nassau voters rejected proposals for implementing new 
forms of government in both 1925 and 1935.75 
While Nassau’s voters rejected reforms, its local politicians 
were under increasing pressure from the state to create some type of 
reform.76  So the solution to Nassau’s many governments and dis-
tricts was to keep Nassau’s many governments and districts intact 
with the introduction of several compromise measures.77  In 1932, the 
state enacted what amounted to a freeze on new commissioner run 
districts, by abolishing all separate boards of commissioners for im-
provement districts except for fire districts and those that previously 
existed under the law’s savings clause.78  The law also extended this 
ban to services provided by villages, effectively transferring the pow-
er to provide any newly created services to Nassau’s towns.79  In 
1936, Nassau County finally approved a charter for a new form of 
 
71 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 33. 
72 Teaford, Pioneer of the Crabgrass Frontier, supra note 53, at 33. 
73 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 34.  The amendment changed Art. 3, §§ 26 
and 27 of the old constitution to establish governing bodies in Nassau and Westchester. 
Votes Cast For and Against Proposed Constitutional Conventions and Also Proposed Con-
stitutional Amendments, N.Y. STATE COURTS, https://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-
history-new-york/documents/Publications_Votes-Cast-Conventions-Amendments.pdf (last 
visited April 10, 2016) [hereinafter Votes]. 
74 The measure was passed on November 8, 1921 by a total of 655,506 for and 640,701 
against and won narrow support in Nassau winning by only 361 votes. Votes, supra note 73; 
TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 34. 
75 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 35-38. 
76 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 37. 
77 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 40. 
78 N.Y. TOWN LAW § 61 (McKinney 2016); Id. § 341; see 27 N.Y. JUR. 2D COUNTIES, ETC. 
§ 1337; Howard Weitzman, Nassau County Special Districts: The Case for Reform, NASSAU 
CNTY., Dec. 19, 2005 https://www.nassaucountyny.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1356 [here-
inafter Weitzman, The Case for Reform]. 
79 N.Y. TOWN LAW § 61.  For a concise explanation of the change, see 26 N.Y. JUR. 2D 
COUNTIES, ETC. § 750. 
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government that went into effect in 1938.80  It created an elected 
county executive, with its legislative body consisting of a board of 
supervisors.81  This board consisted of the supervisors of each of 
Nassau’s three towns and its two cities and operated under a 
“weighted” voting system.82  The County Charter also created coun-
ty-wide functions of the Nassau police force and a county assessment 
system.83  Some years later, then-County Attorney and Professor Jack 
B. Weinstein commented that at the time, these improvements were 
“remarkable achievements,” providing “a model for other counties of 
the state.”84  While transferring power to the county, the charter also 
put limitations on the towns.  Townships and villages retained their 
planning authority, but the county had veto power over any zoning 
regulation that involved municipal boundary lines.85  This policy pre-
vented municipalities from placing undesirable land uses at their pe-
ripheries, creating a potential externality for an abutting communi-
ty.86 
A major proponent of the 1936 charter and Nassau’s first Coun-
ty Executive under the new system, Russel Sprague, stated that the 
charter was created under “the theory of the ‘two layers’ of govern-
ment.”87  According to Sprague, the lower layer “ensured ‘the preser-
vation of home rule’ while the “county governmental layer was to be 
brought up to date.”88  That Sprague was such an advocate of the 
“two layer” system is no accident.  A key factor in the defeat of the 
 
80 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1936, ch. 879, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 618. 
81 Id. § 102. 
82 Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decisions on Counties 
and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 44-45, n.95 (1965).  Be-
fore his Article III days, Judge Weinstein served as H. Eugene Nickerson’s County Attorney. 
Jack B. Weinstein, In Memoriam – Eugene H. Nickerson, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (2002). 
83 Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decision on Counties and Other 
Forms of Municipal Government, supra note 82, at n.95.  Judge Weinstein cites the charter 
as creating a county wide police force, but Teaford documents a county-wide police force 
created in 1925 that “patrol[led] unincorporated areas and any villages that chose to avail 
themselves of the service.” TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 36. 
84 Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment Decision on Counties and Other 
Forms of Municipal Government, supra note 82, at n.95. 
85 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 39. 
86 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 39. 
87 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 40.  Sprague was elected County Execu-
tive in 1937 and went on to serve five consecutive terms, stepping down in 1952.  While 
Sprague was County Executive, he also remained Chairman of the Nassau County Republi-
can Committee, an indicator of just how powerful the Republican machine was in Nassau 
(quoting RUSSELL SPRAGUE, NASSAU COUNTY CHARTER 224-25). 
88 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 40. 
15
Fishbein: 300 Governments
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
550 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
1925 and 1935 government proposals was Republican Party opposi-
tion, which from early on in Nassau’s history had a machine hold on 
the County’s politics.89 Thus, the 1936 proposal that passed was not 
just a compromise between a centralized government and decentral-
ized services, but also a compromise between state interests and local 
Republicans’ interests in maintaining power.90 
Sprague’s iteration of county government would last for dec-
ades until 1993, when Judge Spatt in Jackson v. Nassau Cnty. Bd. of 
Supervisors91 ruled that Nassau’s system of weighted voting violated 
the one-person, one-vote principle of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.92  In its place, members of the Board of 
Supervisors negotiated the district lines of a new legislative body 
consisting of 19 single-member districts, which Nassau’s voters ap-
proved by referendum in 1994.93  While the Board of Supervisors is 
no longer in existence, the centralized features transferred to the 
county government remains, which has caused significant problems 
for the county decades later.94 
 
89 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 35-38.  The old Nassau Republican ma-
chine was a well-known institution, and as late as 2001, there were even references to it in 
preparatory school textbooks as one of the last remaining bona fide political machines in the 
country. Bruce Lambert, Party Machine A Ballot Issue For the G.O.P. in Nassau, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 3, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/03/nyregion/party-machine-a-
ballot-issue-for-the-gop-in-nassau.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias 
%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A11%22%7D (Dr. Howard A Scarrow, a political 
science professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, stated: “[a]ll the text-
books mention Nassau as about the last of the old machines remaining, the biggest and most 
spectacular . . . One book even has a picture of its headquarters.”  While I did not find an old 
textbook during the course of my researching for this article, reading about the old Republi-
can machine in my middle school social studies class precipitated the search for this news 
article.). 
90 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 40-41. 
91 818 F. Supp. 509, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
92 It should be noted that while Judge Weinstein thought Nassau’s previous iterations of 
government were “remarkable achievements,” he also prophetically saw weighted voting as 
a potential problem down the road, and importantly opined that he did not think weighted 
voting was an ideal method of apportionment. Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reappor-
tionment Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, supra note 82, 
at 44-46, n.95. (“Conceivably, if the voting rights of those in the most populous town were 
more seriously impaired, the limitation would constitute an unconstitutional impediment.”). 
93 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1936, ch. 879, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 618; Peter 
Marks, Nassau Board Approves a Legislative Map, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 1994), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/03/nyregion/nassau-board-approves-a-legislative-
map.html (“Several supervisors said the pressure on the board to avoid having a map im-
posed on the county by the Federal court was a major factor in getting Democrats and Re-
publicans to reach an agreement.”). 
94 It should also be noted that while Judge Weinstein was perhaps at the time correct about 
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During post-war America throughout the 1940s and 1950s, 
Nassau’s population tripled from its pre-war population.95  The more 
Nassau developed, the more it transcended suburbia altogether, be-
coming an edge city that mixed suburban and urban elements into a 
“hybrid” community.96 
But just as Nassau’s population increased rapidly before the 
war, its municipal officials a generation later again sought to use 
boundary-lines to ensure the exclusivity of existing communities with 
race, ethnic, and socioeconomic standing playing a significant factor 
in new development.97  Because the state curbed the ability of munic-
ipalities to provide services through commissioner-run special dis-
tricts or villages when it enacted Town Law Section 61 decades earli-
er, Nassau’s towns were required to find new ways to increase the 
amount of decentralized governments by other means than their pre-
1932 method of incorporating villages and commissioner-run special 
 
the innovation of the county assessment system, the system today is structurally broken with 
reforms proposed regularly. Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 9 N.E.3d 
351, 357 (N.Y. 2014) (“In 2002, the County Comptroller announced that the County had 
more than $2.8 billion in debt . . . [and] blamed the debt burden in part on the unusually 
large number of tax certiorari proceedings in the county and in part on the County Guaran-
ty.”).  Because the county was responsible for the numerical calculation of tax assessments, 
in 1948 the Board of Supervisors created the colloquially named “County Guaranty” that 
shifted all assessment error and surplus payments from tax grievances to the county. Id. at 
355.  The State Legislature acquiesced and carved out an exception in its Real Property Tax 
Law for Nassau County. Id. at 355.  However, this system has become a major burden for 
the county, as it had to borrow more than $80 million annually. Robert Brodsky, State Law-
makers Pass Overhaul of Nassau Tax Challenge System, NEWSDAY (June 24, 2014), 
http://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/state-lawmakers-pass-overhaul-of-nassau-tax-
challenge-system-1.8519871.  In 2014, Nassau County lost a court battle to repeal the Coun-
ty Guaranty unilaterally without the State Legislature’s approval. Baldwin Union Free Sch. 
Dist., 9 N.E.3d at 353. Reform has not been enacted since. 
95 Richard L. Forstall, New York: Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 
1990, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (Mar. 27, 1995), 
http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/ny190090.txt. 
96 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 46.  In 1991, journalist Joel Garreau 
coined the phrase “edge cities” to describe the phenomenon of post-suburban metropolises. 
TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 1.  Edge cities lack the typical features of sub-
urbs, particularly with respect to the lack of reliance on their sister city as the center of 
commerce. TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 1-2.  Teaford surveyed six “edge 
cities:” Oakland County, Michigan; DuPage County, Illinois, St. Louis County, Missouri; 
Orange County, California; and of course, Nassau and Suffolk Counties. TEAFORD, POST-
SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 3. 
97 See generally Amanda Tillotson, Race, Risk and Real Estate: The Federal Housing 
Administration and Black Homeownership in the Post World War II Home Ownership State, 
8 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 25 (2014); Marc Seitles, The Perpetuation Of Residential Racial 
Segregation In America: Historical Discrimination, Modern Forms Of Exclusion, And Inclu-
sionary Remedies, 14 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 89 (1998). 
17
Fishbein: 300 Governments
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
552 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
districts.98  The solution this time was to keep the number of munici-
palities the same but to proliferate the number of special districts that 
were administered by the towns (which, of course, would appoint an 
administrator who often would have the title of “commissioner”).99  
According to Teaford, “[f]rom 1945 to 1955 the number of nonschool 
special districts in Nassau County climbed from 199 to 268.”100  And, 
not surprisingly, “all of Nassau’s 41 fire districts” were commission-
er-run, under Section 61’s exemption.101 
By 1970, Nassau reached its highest population at 1.4 million 
and has since topped off at around 1.3 million.102  Its population total 
has since remained relatively stable.103  But the number of special 
districts remains, along with rising costs, higher taxes and fiscal in-
solvency that County Executives decades later have fought to elimi-
nate. 
B. Reining in the “Unnatural Wonder”: The Suozzi 
Administration 
In 2001, Democrats Thomas Suozzi and Howard Weitzman 
won their seats in a historic election, breaching the Republican politi-
cal machine’s hold on the County’s executive branch.104  Suozzi be-
came the first Democrat elected to the office of County Executive 
since H. Eugene Nickerson, who served from 1962-1970.105  The vic-
 
98 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 59-60. 
99 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 59-60. 
100 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 59. 
101 TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA, supra note 52, at 60. 
102 Richard Forstall, New York: Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 
1990, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS (Mar. 27, 1995), 
http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/ny190090.txt. 
103 Id. 
104 Bruce Lambert, The 2001 Elections: Nassau County; Suozzi Wins Easily in Rebuke of 
Nassau's G.O.P. Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/07/nyregion/2001-elections-nassau-county-suozzi-wins-
easily-rebuke-nassau-s-gop-machine.html.  Two years prior in 1999, Democrats won the leg-
islative majority for the first time since the legislature’s inception, ending one party rule and 
serving the first blow to the Republican machine in decades. David M. Halbfinger, The 1999 
Elections: Nassau; Nassau County Halts a Century of G.O.P. Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 
1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/03/nyregion/the-1999-elections-nassau-nassau-
county-halts-a-century-of-gop-rule.html. 
105  Halbfinger, supra note 104.  Nickerson, like his Democratic successor decades later, 
also foresaw the need to fix the special district problem. Weitzman, The Case for Reform, 
supra note 78, at 2 (“Nickerson blamed the previous decade’s ‘fantastic rises’ in taxes on, 
among other things, ‘the perpetuation of fragmented, irresponsible special taxing districts.’”) 
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tory was achieved largely in part due to the county’s financial trou-
bles, for which many pointed to Suozzi’s predecessor, Thomas Gulot-
ta, as the source of fiscal mismanagement.106 
Just one year before the election, Governor George Pataki and 
the New York State legislature created the Nassau Interim Finance 
Authority (NIFA) to bring oversight and long-term structural reform 
to Nassau County’s government.107  The County in dire financial 
 
(quoting ARTURO F. GONZALEZ, EUGENE H. NICKERSON: STATESMAN OF A NEW SOCIETY 28 
(James H. Heineman, Inc. 1964)).  After his tenure as County Executive, Nickerson served a 
remarkable career as a federal judge. See, Weinstein, In Memoriam – Eugene H. Nickerson, 
supra note 82. 
106 Vivian S. Toy, It's Broke, and He Has to Fix It, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/23/nyregion/it-s-broke-and-he-has-to-fix-it.html.  Thomas 
Gulotta was the Nassau County Executive from 1987 to 2001, choosing not to seek reelec-
tion due to the County’s plummeting finances.  While his tenure in office was ultimately 
marred by the County’s financial shortcomings, Gulotta was a political force for decades, 
considered by many a legitimate candidate for governor in 1990 and in 1994. Al Baker, The 
Man Who Could Not Say No Cries Uncle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2001) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/18/nyregion/the-man-who-could-not-say-no-cries-
uncle.html?src=pm&pagewanted=1.  Nevertheless, in Nassau County politics Gulotta’s sur-
name has become synonymous with fiscal mismanagement.  The practice of using the word 
“Gulotta” to describe the County Executive’s handling of Nassau’s finances has become so 
commonplace, that Newsday’s Editorial Board in 2014 coined the term “Gulottaville” in de-
scribing the current state of budgetary policies. Editorial Op., Editorial: Nassau County is on 
the Road to Gulottaville, NEWSDAY (July 26, 2014), 
http://www.newsday.com/opinion/nassau-county-is-on-the-road-to-gulottaville-editorial-
1.8891205. 
107 N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3652 (McKinney 2016); see generally Nassau Interim Fi-
nance Authority 2000 Annual Report (2000), 
http://www.nifa.state.ny.us/reports_financial/annual/2000AnnualReport.pdf.  NIFA is a pub-
lic benefit corporation of the State of New York created in June 2000 to oversee the Coun-
ty’s finances in response to Nassau’s then growing fiscal crisis. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW, ch. 
43–A, art. 10–D, T. 1.  The act gave NIFA a toolbox including the ability to issue bonds and 
notes to restructure the County’s debt, and the ability to declare a “control period,” a drastic 
measure, which when triggered gives NIFA substantial oversight and veto authority over the 
County’s budget. Id. §§ 3656, 3669.  There are several ways to trigger a control period; the 
most relevant method being that the county incurs a major operating funds deficit of one 
percent or more during a given fiscal year. Id. § 3669; see also Cnty. of Nassau v. Nassau 
Cnty. Interim Fin. Auth., 920 N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2011) (finding 
determination of “control period” by NIFA to be a valid imposition of authority).  Since 
2000, avoiding a NIFA “control period” has become a barometer for the County’s fiscal 
health. See e.g., David M. Halbfinger, New York State Seizes Finances of Nassau County, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/27/nyregion/27nassau.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  Being 
an administration under NIFA control has been shown to have major political consequences 
not only because of the objective determination of fiscal failure, but also because a control 
period hamstrings the County Executive’s ability to negotiate labor contracts. See Carver v. 
Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin. Auth., 730 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2013).  However, as dire as a trigger-
ing of a “control period” may be, it is not necessarily fatal to the County Executive’s reelec-
tion outcome. See Dan Janison, Nassau's Mangano: Now NIFA 'Communicates,' NEWSDAY 
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straits was $2.7 billion in debt, allocating nearly a quarter of its 
spending to debt service.108  As a result, the County’s bonds had been 
downgraded by rating agencies to just one level above junk status.109  
By the end of his term, Gulotta had averted a takeover of the Coun-
ty’s finances by NIFA, but still left office with the County’s fiscal 
health on shaky ground.110  Just days before the 2001 inauguration, 
the Maxwell School of Government rated Nassau the “worst run” 
county in the nation out of the 40 largest.111 
Inheriting the fiscal mess, the newly elected Suozzi and Weit-
zman took the challenge head on and with enthusiasm.  In their first 
term, the pair quickly turned around the County’s finances: reducing 
the County’s portion of residents’ property taxes, reducing employee 
headcount and keeping spending growth behind inflation.112  In his 
proposed budget for fiscal year 2006, Suozzi froze property taxes for 
a third straight year and for the first time since he took office, did not 
request NIFA issued bonds, touting 10 straight credit-rating up-
grades.113  With such expeditious progress, in September 2005 Suozzi 
triumphantly declared: “the fiscal crisis is over.”114  That November, 
 
(Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/politics/spin-cycle-1.812042/nassau-
s-mangano-now-nifa-communicates-1.6493151?&p=393221. 
108 Halbfinger, New York State Seizes Finances of Nassau County, supra note 107. 
109 Michael Cooper, Pataki Proposes a Fiscal Bailout of Nassau County, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 10, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/10/nyregion/pataki-proposes-a-fiscal-
bailout-of-nassau-county.html?pagewanted=all. 
110 Tina Kelley, Nassau Averts Takeover, But Not Close Oversight, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 
2000), over-
sight.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A
7%22%7D.  Even in his last days of office, Gullota made several last minute changes to the 
budget that at least the N.Y. Times Editorial Board thought was fiscally irresponsible. Edito-
rial Bd., Thomas Gulotta's Irresponsible Exit, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/22/opinion/thomas-gulotta-s-irresponsible-
ex-
it.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A7%
22%7D. 
111 Robert Brodsky, Thomas Suozzi Pushes for Second Chance in Nassau County Execu-
tive Race, NEWSDAY (Oct. 30, 2013, 11:56 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-
island/nassau/thomas-suozzi-pushes-for-second-chance-in-nassau-county-executive-race-
1.6350690. 
112 Office of the County Executive, Repairing, Reforming, and Reimagining Nassau: The 
Suozzi Administration 2002-2009 (2009), 
http://suozzi.3cdn.net/0e8be36e72864001e4_p1m629h3h.pdf. 
113 Bruce Lambert, Nassau Executive Declares County Fiscal Crisis is Over, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 13, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/13/nyregion/metrocampaigns/13nassau.html?pagewanted=
print. 
114 Id. 
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Suozzi and Weitzman won reelection with commanding majorities, in 
due part to their first term accomplishments.115 
Suozzi’s first term success garnered statewide and national at-
tention.116  It also won him a good deal of political capital.  Suozzi 
would spend it on two fronts in his second term: an unsuccessful gu-
bernatorial bid in 2006 against Eliot Spitzer and an aggressive agenda 
to further reform Nassau County.117  The latter yielded bold policy 
proposals including the Property Tax Cap and the Nassau County 
Master Plan for a “new suburbia.”118  These policies had broad scope 
and substance to make Nassau County an attractable suburb for a new 
generation of New York suburbanites.119  Suozzi’s leadership in pass-
ing the Property Tax Cap statewide as a vehicle for reducing local 
 
115 Bruce Lambert, Democrats Score Gains in Nassau and Suffolk, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/09/nyregion/09nassau.html?module=Search&mabReward
=relbias%3As%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A7%22%7D (“With almost all of the vote 
counted, Mr. Suozzi had a margin of more than 20 points over his Republican opponent, 
Gregory Peterson - an impressive showing, since Republicans still hold an enrollment 
edge.”). 
116 Campbell Robertson, Up for Re-election, and Maybe More Suozzi, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
20, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/20/nyregion/20lisuoz.html?pagewanted=1.  Not 
all of Suozzi’s media attention was garnered strictly through governing.  For the 2004 elec-
tion, Suozzi created the “Fix Albany” political action committee with the backing of former 
New York City Mayor Ed Koch, raising $150,000.  The “Fix Albany” campaign targeted 
Republicans as well as a Democratic state senator, which caused quite a ruckus during the 
2004 Democratic National Convention when the Democratic Speaker Sheldon Silver at-
tempted to block Suozzi from the convention. Chris Smith, The Suozzi-Spitzer Showdown, 
N.Y. MAG., http://nymag.com/nymetro/news/politics/columns/citypolitic/15396/ (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2016); Bruce Lambert, After Mixed Results, Suozzi Presses On to Fix Albany, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/nyregion/07suozzi.html.  Re-
gardless of how you view optics, many saw substance in Suozzi’s first term achievements.  
One organization, Governing Magazine, named Suozzi the 2005 State and Local Govern-
ment Public Official of the Year. Rob Gurwitt, Public Officials of the Year: Thomas R. Suoz-
zi, 2005 Honoree, GOVERNING MAG., http://www.governing.com/poy/Thomas-Suozzi.html 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
117 Patrick Healy, Spitzer and Clinton Win in N.Y. Primary, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/13/nyregion/13york.html?ref=nyregion. 
118 Nicholas Confessore, Panel Urges 4% Tax Cap on Property in New York, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 3, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/03/nyregion/03taxes.html; Mike Russo, 
Nassau County: A Model for the Nation? LI HERALD (Oct. 1, 2009), 
http://liherald.com/eastmeadow/stories/Nassau-County-A-model-for-the-nation,849 (indicat-
ing that “Suozzi proposes master plan hinging on Lighthouse, downtown revitalizations”); 
Bruce Lambert, Rethinking the Nation’s First Suburb, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/25/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/25liburb.ready.html?pagew
anted=all. 
119 See Marcelle S. Fischler, Retrofitting for a ‘New Suburbia,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/04/realestate/04Lizo.html. 
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government tax levies would have lasting impact years later.120 
While Suozzi’s innovative governance was necessary for the 
long-term success of the county, the 2008 fiscal crisis and precedent 
gubernatorial primary left him exposed when he ran for a third term.  
In a surprising upset by only a few hundred votes, Suozzi lost his 
reelection bid to Edward Mangano in 2009.121 
Often lost in the popular narrative of Suozzi’s and Weitzman’s 
tenure in office were their efforts to solve the special district problem.  
Even with their marked success in reviving the county’s finances, 
school, water, fire, sanitation library, town and village taxes levies 
consisted of a much larger percentage of a resident’s tax bill.122 
In their second term, the pair launched a multiyear effort to ad-
dress the problem.  Their objective was to first further identify the 
scope of Nassau County’s special district problem and to second, im-
plement solutions to deal with it.  In 2005, Weitzman’s office issued 
the first in a series of reports outlining the need for special district re-
form.123  In it the Comptroller reported his findings from six sanita-
tion district audits performed by his office.124  Weitzman found sys-
temic problems with how these sanitation districts conducted 
business including inadequate procurement policies, poor accounting 
practices, inadequate time keeping and payroll procedures and im-
proper procurement of legal services.125  In particular, Weitzman 
found that the larger districts audited imposed lower taxes for their 
services than their smaller counterparts.126  As a result, the Comptrol-
ler recommended a larger scale review of special districts within the 
county.127 
In the interim, in 2006 Weitzman in conjunction with Hofstra 
University held a symposium on Nassau’s special districts.128  The 
 
120 See infra Part III. 
121 William Murphy, Suozzi Concedes; Mangano to Take Helm in Nassau, NEWSDAY 
(Dec. 1, 2009, 10:24 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/suozzi-concedes-
mangano-to-take-helm-in-nassau-1.1631322. 
122 Press Release, Office of the Nassau Cnty. Comptroller, Comptroller Weitzman Stands 
with Governor, Cnty. Exec & Civic Grps. to Rally for Reforms of Special Dists. (Feb. 8, 
2008) (on file with the author). 
123 Weitzman, The Case for Reform, supra note 78. 
124 Weitzman, The Case for Reform, supra note 78, at i. 
125 Weitzman, The Case for Reform, supra note 78, at i-ii. 
126 Weitzman, The Case for Reform, supra note 78. 
127 Weitzman, The Case for Reform, supra note 78, at 17-18. 
128 Conference on Nassau County Special Districts, HOFSTRA (June 8, 2006), 
http://www.hofstra.edu/Academics/CSS/css_conf_060806.html. 
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conference garnered bi-partisan turnout among Nassau’s elected offi-
cials and was also well represented by local think tanks including the 
Rauch Foundation and Hofstra University’s Center for Suburban 
Studies.129 
At the end of 2006, Weitzman released another report detailing 
cost saving ideas for Nassau’s special districts.130  The Comptroller’s 
office studied major expenditures including insurance, hiring, and 
purchasing, concluding that between $23.8 and $35.7 million could 
be saved if special districts county-wide adopted better spending 
practices.131  Among the suggestions included a call to Nassau towns 
to increase their oversight practices.132 
In 2007, Weitzman followed up with yet another report in an at-
tempt to understand cost disparities in pricing for services among 
special districts.  His office found that variation in pricing occurred 
when “(1) the district spends more; and (2) the district has signifi-
cantly more commercial property than the average district to subsi-
dize the cost charged to residential home owners.”133  Importantly, 
Weitzman found that cost was not correlated with quality of ser-
vice.134  Additionally, the Comptroller included more particularized 
estimates to cost-savings.  For instance, in the Town of Hempstead, 
households could see $168 dollars in tax savings per year if the town 
instead of six independent commissioner-run entities ran garbage col-
lection districts.135 
In the same year, Suozzi put out his own literature on the mat-
 
129 Howard S. Weitzman, Cost Disparities in Special Districts in Nassau County (Dec. 18, 
2007), http://www.nassaucountyny.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1361 [hereinafter Weitzman, 
Cost Disparities in Special Districts].  According to Weitzman, approximately 400 people 
attended the event including a bi-partisan collection of elected officials including “then as-
semblyman Thomas DiNapoli, then Senator Michael Balboni, [now former] County Execu-
tive Thomas R. Suozzi, [now former] Comptroller Howard S. Weitzman, [now former] 
Chairman of the Board of Assessors Harvey Levinson,” now former Supervisor and current 
NIFA Chairman Jon Kaiman and Supervisors Kate Murray and John Venditto. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at vi. 
132 Id. at 41. 
133 Howard S. Weitzman, Nassau County Office of the Comptroller- Cost Disparities in 
Special Districts in Nassau County (Dec. 18, 2007), 
https://www.nassaucountyny.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1361. 
134 Id.  The Comptroller’s office showed quality of service did not correlate to cost in sani-
tation districts through two metrics: curbside service versus back door service (which in the-
ory should be costlier) and frequency of pickup. 
135 Id. For more information on methodology, see infra Part IV (discussing suggestions to 
fix Nassau’s special district problems to achieve both efficiency and equity aims). 
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ter, but from a different angle: commissioner election dates.  After a 
survey of 71 special districts throughout the county, Suozzi found 
that special district elections occurred on 24 different days through-
out the year, with not a single one occurring on Election Day—when 
voter turnout would typically be the highest.136  In contrast, voter 
turnout for four of the districts audited in Weitzman’s 2005 report 
was three percent or less—well below any off year election in recent 
memory.137 
C. Parallel Efforts at the State Level: Passage of the 
Government Reorganization and Citizen 
Empowerment Act and the Property Tax Cap 
Suozzi’s and Weitzman’s efforts at the county level were origi-
nal and novel attempts at dealing with the special district problem.  
Yet in many ways what they sought to do was nothing new in the 
“post-suburbia” era.  Over the past few decades New York governors 
have committed themselves to similar exploration.  But these efforts 
to engage state and local officials prior to 2005 were largely unsuc-
cessful.  A 1992 study looking at school consolidation produced few 
tangible results.138  A 1993 commission for local government reform 
established by Mario Cuomo proposed reforms—none of which were 
enacted.139  A 2004 commission established by George Pataki pro-
duced even fewer results, failing to release a final report.140 
But in 2006 momentum started to build for a reinvigorated 
statewide response to tackle the problem.  Making the issue a cam-
paign platform, Governor Spitzer in April 2007 launched the state 
commission on “Local Government Efficiency and Competive-
ness.”141  This commission had wide ranging support from elected of-
ficials throughout the state, notably then Attorney General Andrew 
Cuomo and State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli, whose offices both 
 
136 Weitzman, supra note 129. 
137 Weitzman, supra note 129.  Voter turnout in the last county executive race was 29 per-
cent. Dan Janison, Voter Turnout Disappointing in Tuesday's Elections, NEWSDAY (Nov. 11, 
2013, 1:33 AM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/columnists/dan-janison/voter-
turnout-disappointing-in-tuesday-s-elections-1.6413164. 
138 Maureen Nolan, New York State School District Won’t Merge Even When Offered Ex-
tra Money, THE POST STANDARD (Mar. 4, 2012, 7:11 AM), 
http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2012/03/new_york_state_school_district.html. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
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worked in coordination with the Governor’s toward reform.142  Over 
a one year period the commission gathered input from local officials, 
identified initiatives of interest among municipalities, and commis-
sioned consultant studies to perform cost benefit analysis among oth-
er data driven inquires.143  Concurrently, the Comptroller’s office is-
sued several information-gathering reports on special districts and the 
possible benefits of dissolution and intermunicipal coordination.144  
In 2008, the commission released its final report making recommen-
dations in seven areas: centralizing and expanding regional shared 
services; modernizing municipal structures through updated legal 
frameworks; school district restructuring and expanding back end 
services; homogenized election dates and procedures; providing aids 
and incentivizes through grants; addressing structural cost drivers; 
and providing sustained sufficiency and continuity.145 
The commission translated its recommendations into legislation 
and in 2009, the legislature passed the New N.Y. Government Reor-
ganization and Citizen Empowerment Act.  That law replaced the 
previous consolidation and dissolution system and implemented a 
simpler system for enacting reform.146  Among its features, the law 
reduced the required number of signatures required for consolidation 
and dissolution petitions from 33 percent to no more than 10 percent 
of the municipality’s electorate in most instances.147  Also important-
 
142 Once Mr. Suozzi’s rival for County Executive, State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli 
saw a common cause to collaborate with the Nassau County Executive for local government 
reform.  Press Release, Office of the N.Y. State Comptroller, DiNapoli & Suozzi Propose 
Measures to Reform Special Dists. (Jun. 6, 2007); John Rather, A Skeptical New Look at 
Special Tax Districts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/23districtsli.html?_r=0. 
143 Rather, supra note 142; REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY & COMPETITIVENESS 1-9 (2008). 
144 See Rather, supra note 142; OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER, TOWN 
SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN NEW YORK: BACKGROUND, TRENDS AND ISSUES 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/townspecialdistricts.pdf (last visited Apr. 
5, 2016) [hereinafter TOWN SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN NEW YORK]; OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK 
STATE COMPTROLLER, INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION: EXPLORING 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR SHARED SERVICE DELIVER,  
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/cooperation1.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 
2016) [hereinafter INTERMUNICIPAL COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION]. 
145 Rather, supra note 142. 
146 N.Y. TOWN LAW § 202 (c) (McKinney 2016).  The previous system of dissolution ex-
isted under N.Y. TOWN LAW § 202-c. Much of this section has been amended. 
147 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 757 (McKinney 2016). According to Section 757 of the Gen-
eral Municipal Law: 
The petition shall contain the signatures of at least ten percent of the 
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ly, the law eliminated a provision requiring that only owners of real 
property within the district were eligible petitioners.148  The success-
ful enactment of the consolidation and dissolution law has had sus-
tained impact on other state governments, with other states using the 
act as a model for themselves.149 
Supplementing the consolidation law, New York State also 
sought to spur intermunicipal activity through its Local Government 
Efficiency Grant program.150  These grants replaced an older version 
and sought to reduce transaction costs associated with consolidations 
and intermunicipal agreements such as impact studies.151 
While the consolidation law went through the legislative pro-
cess, state officials were concurrently working on other legislation to 
reduce local government costs.  In 2008 Governor Spitzer designated 
a complementary commission to the Local Government Efficiency 
Commission entitled the New York State Commission on Property 
Tax Relief.152  Then County Executive Tom Suozzi was appointed 
the committee’s chair.153  The committee vigorously analyzed New 
York’s property tax problems and in particular the two most structur-
al issues.154  The first was that while state tax dollars were in relative 
 
number of electors or five thousand electors, whichever is less, in each 
local government entity to be consolidated; provided, however, that 
where the local government entity to be consolidated contains five hun-
dred or fewer electors, the petition shall contain the signatures of at least 
twenty percent of the number of electors. 
Id.; N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 779(2) (noting the parallel language for dissolution procedures). 
148 Nicholas Confessore, Senate Passes Bill to Ease Government Consolidation, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/nyregion/04consolidate.html.  
The law eliminated the following language: 
Such petition shall be signed by resident owners of taxable real property 
aggregating at least one-half of all the taxable real property of the district 
owned by resident owners according to the latest completed assessment 
roll of the town, and acknowledged or proved in the same manner as a 
deed to be recorded . . . . 
See 2009 N.Y. Laws Ch. 74 (A. 8501). 
149 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3987/99 (2011).  In 2011, Illinois passed the Local Government 
Consolidation Act of 2011.  According to the Illinois Commission, the state’s bête noire 
served as inspiration for its own law. Id.  
150 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 54 (McKinney 2016). 
151 Id.; Press Release, Dep’t of State Div. of Local Gov’t Services, Local Gov’t Efficiency 
Grant Applications (2008), http://www.nyslocalgov.org/pdf/Blast_September_08.pdf. 
152 The New York State Commission on Property Tax Relief: Preliminary Report (June 3, 
2008), http://blog.syracuse.com/indepth/2008/06/Suozzi%20report. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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proportion with the nationwide average, the local property tax bill 
outside New York City was a whopping 79 percent above the nation-
al average, the highest in the nation.155  That disparity is in part due to 
the second structural problem: That school districts outside of New 
York City spent more than any other per student in the nation at 
$18,768.156 
The committee recommended multiple courses of action, one of 
which was the Property Tax Cap.157  The proposal made it all the way 
to the Governor’s desk, and in 2011 Governor Cuomo signed it into 
law. 
D. Post-Enactment and the Andrew Cuomo 
Administration 
Progress toward reducing the size and number of local govern-
ments after the enactment of the consolidation law has been mediocre 
at best.  It has certainly yielded interest by local governments and lo-
cal activists to initiate consolidations and engage in intermunicipal 
coordination.158  At the helm of New York State’s government after 
the consolidation law’s enactment is Andrew Cuomo.  The two-term 
Governor has been an active proponent of special district reform 
throughout his tenure in the state’s highest office and as Attorney 
General.159 While Governor Spitzer proposed the efficiency commis-
sion in 2007, and while Governor Paterson signed the consolidation 
bill into law in 2009, it was Attorney General Cuomo who drafted the 
legislation introduced in the state house.160 
Indeed, Cuomo campaigned on reducing the size of local gov-
ernment in both his gubernatorial elections.  In 2010 he issued cam-
paign content advertising the successful passage of the consolidation 
 
155 Id. at 13. 
156 Id. at 18. 
157  Confessore, supra note 148, at 3.  The committee had three recommendations.  The 
first was the Property Tax Cap, the second was a STAR homeowner tax credit reform called 
a “circuit breaker” based on income, and the third was a series of more general recommenda-
tions on state law and unfunded mandate relief, including passing the LGEC’s recommenda-
tions and reforming the state pension system, much of which was has been passed as well. 
158 See Local Government Efficiency Studies & Reports, DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF LOCAL 
GOV’T SERVS. (2011), 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/lge/Case_Studies.html#consolidationdissolution (providing vari-
ous reports created by municipalities to study consolidation). 
159 Confessore, supra note 148. 
160 Confessore, supra note 148. 
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law.161  In 2014 Cuomo went a step further airing a 30 second cam-
paign ad entitled “Castle,” stating that while state income taxes have 
decreased, local property taxes continue to be the highest in the na-
tion because of “the waste and duplication of our over 10,000 local 
governments.”162 
The Governor’s campaign promises have also been followed up 
with substance.  In 2014, New York State went a step further in at-
tempting to constrain local government spending with the Property 
Tax Freeze.163  In addition to continuing applications for the Local 
Government Efficiency Grant, the Governor also created the Local 
Government Citizens Reorganization Empowerment Grant.164  This 
grant is a non-competitive grant designed to encourage the study and 
implementation of consolidation schemes.165  In 2015, Governor 
Cuomo furthered his continued support of the grant system, calling 
for $150 million to be added to the current grant structure in a new 
“Local Government Efficiency Fund” in his 2015 State of the State 
Opportunity Agenda.166 
E. Rematch: Suozzi 2013 
In 2013, Tom Suozzi and Howard Weitzman ran for their old 
jobs against Ed Mangano and George Maragos.167  The election came 
 
161 Anderson, supra note 35, at 1393-94 (citing and describing Cuomo’s now defunct 
2010 campaign literature). 
162 Jesse McKinley, Cuomo, Citing Local Government Waste, Says It’s ‘Time We Fix’ 
High Property Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/nyregion/cuomo-citing-local-government-waste-says-
its-time-we-fix-high-property-taxes.html. 
163 Freeman Klopott, Cuomo Backs $2.2 Billion in N.Y. Tax Cuts Proposed by Panel, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 6, 2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-
06/cuomo-backs-panel-s-call-for-two-year-n-y-property-tax-freeze. 
164 Press Release, Dep’t of State, Sec’y of State Perales Announces Application Availabil-
ity for Local Gov’t Efficiency Grant & the Local Gov’t Citizens Reorganization Empower-
ment Grant Programs (Dec. 15, 2011) http://www.dos.ny.gov/press/2011/1215grants.html. 
165 Id. 
166 Andrew Cuomo, Opportunity Agenda: 2015 State of the State Address 24-25 (2015) 
http://nysbroadband.ny.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015_Opportunity_Agenda_Book.
pdf. 
167 Joseph Berger, Rematch for Nassau Executive Could Be Bellwether of National Trend, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/02/nyregion/rematch-for-
nassau-executive-could-be-bellwether-of-national-trend.html?pagewanted=all (“‘It’s the 
Thrilla in Mineola,’ said Lawrence Levy, executive dean of the National Center for Subur-
ban Studies at Hofstra University.”).  Many political analysts also saw the rematch as a bell-
wether for the nation in the lead up to the 2014 midterm elections. Id. 
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at another period of poor fiscal health for the county.  Just two years 
earlier, Nassau unsuccessfully prevented NIFA’s seizing its finances 
as a result of the county’s 2011 $176 million budget deficit.168  While 
largely caused by the 2008 financial crisis, Mangano’s refusal to co-
operate with the board and refusal to raise property taxes (even up to 
the cap) further aggravated the county’s path toward solvency.169  But 
Mangano’s anti-tax platform in the face of deteriorating county fi-
nances was a popular position.170 
To counter, Suozzi—hamstrung with having raised property 
taxes during the beginning of his own tenure as County Executive—
campaigned on the “ideal suburb.”171  That vision included keeping 
the county and its municipalities within the property tax cap, and fix-
ing the county’s struggling assessment system.172  Another layer was 
to attract young people.173  An additional emphasis was to get the 
county out of NIFA control.174  The last message pillar was an alter-
native position to his consolidation that he advocated for during his 
tenure: getting special districts to collaborate in order to deliver cost 
 
168 Nassau Interim Finance Authority 2011 Annual Report (2011), 
http://www.nifa.state.ny.us/reports_financial/annual/2011AnnualReport.pdf; Halbfinger, 
New York State Seizes Finances of Nassau County, supra note 107. 
169 See Susan Berfield, New York’s Nassau County Going Broke as No One Wants to 
Share Pain, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 14, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
04-14/new-york-s-nassau-county-going-broke-as-no-one-wants-to-share-fiscal-pain.html. 
County Executive Mangano not only resisted NIFA’s recommendations but even waged a 
lawsuit to test the legality of the takeover.  County of Nassau v. Nassau Cnty. Interim Fin. 
Auth., 920 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).  However, Mangano was not the only 
frustrated political actor.  Nassau’s police unions also waged a battle with NIFA testing the 
legality of its wage freeze. Carver v. Nassau Cty. Interim Fin. Auth., 730 F.3d 150, 152 (2d 
Cir. 2013). 
170 Will James, Election 2013: Nassau County Executive Wins Re-Election, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 6, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304391204579180480568844864.  Dean 
Lawrence Levy of Hofstra University’s Suburban Studies Center said “[t]he Republicans 
came up with a simple but powerful message: ‘Thank you, Ed Mangano, for not raising taxes 
and for being there for us after Sandy’ . . . .  ‘Tom Suozzi and the Democrats never came up 
with an effective answer that resonated as personally and as powerfully with voters.’” Id. 
171 Rashed Mian, Tom Suozzi Running for Nassau County Executive . . . Again, LONG 
ISLAND PRESS (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.longislandpress.com/2013/02/13/tom-suozzi-
running-for-nassau-county-executive-again/ (“Nassau County was once the ideal suburb and 
we can be again.”). 
172 Ed Mangano vs. Tom Suozzi: Where They Stand on the Issues, NEWSDAY, 
http://www.newsday.com/elections/ed-mangano-vs-tom-suozzi-where-they-stand-on-the-
issues-1.6316783#sect-1 (last visited Apr. 12, 2016). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
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effective services.175  Citing the political realities of failed consolida-
tion efforts Suozzi was in favor of “getting different . . . [entities] that 
want to work together to figure out how to share costs and to save 
money.”176  While Suozzi’s policy stance was innovative, he and 
Weitzman lost their reelection bids to Mangano and Maragos.177 
Since that election, the county has remained in state receiver-
ship with no timetable for leaving NIFA control.  Compounding this 
problem for the county is a substantial and seemingly structural loss 
in sales tax revenue.178  Consequently, Mangano in 2014 did exactly 
the opposite of what he campaigned on.  After a fervent battle with 
the County Legislature he raised property taxes in late 2014.179 
Mangano and Maragos have also chosen not to use the auditing 
function of the Comptroller’s office to examine special district ineffi-
ciencies.180  Although Mangano has sought some cost-saving 
measures, such as establishing the Long Island Purchasing Counsel in 
conjunction with Suffolk County, he and Maragos have not actively 
advanced new intermunicipal activity.181 
 
175 Dan Janison, Suozzi Goes for 'Collaboration' over 'Consolidation', NEWSDAY (Aug. 
18, 2013 6:04 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/columnists/dan-janison/suozzi-
goes-for-collaboration-over-consolidation-1.5913736. 
176 Id.  In late 2012 the first consolidation referendum on Long Island—disbanding Hemp-
stead Sanitary District No. 2— failed even with grass roots support by local public interests 
groups. For more background see also Will James, Residents Try to Take Out Trash District, 
WALL ST. J. (Jul. 31, 2012, 10:24 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444860104577561133415646876?autologi
n=y. 
177 Jennifer Barrios & Ellen Yan, Edward Mangano Defeats Thomas Suozzi, NEWSDAY 
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/edward-mangano-defeats-thomas-
suozzi-1.6379659. 
178 Memorandum from Maurice Chalmers, Dir., Office of Legis. Budget Review to Hon. 
Howard Kopel, Chair, Budget Review Comm. & All Members of the Budget Review 
Comm. (Aug. 20, 2014) https://www.nassaucountyny.gov/DocumentCenter/View/8919. 
179 Paul Larocco, NIFA OKs Nassau's Budget -- after Pledge to Stop Borrowing for Oper-
ating Costs in 4 Years, NEWSDAY (Nov. 24, 2014 10:19 PM), 
http://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/nifa-ok-s-nassau-s-budget-after-pledge-to-stop-
borrowing-for-operating-costs-in-4-years-1.9650731. 
180 Soon after the Government Reorganization and Citizen’s Empowerment Act took ef-
fect, George Maragos stated that he would not conduct audits of special districts as his pre-
decessor Howard Weitzman had. William Murphy, Nassau Comptroller's Special District 
Policy Knocked, NEWSDAY (Apr. 1, 2010 9:42 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-
island/politics/nassau-comptroller-s-special-district-policy-knocked-1.1842798. 
181 Press Release, N.Y. State Ass’n of Counties, Cty. Execs, Mangano & Levy Announce 
Second Joint Purchase to Achieve Millions in Taxpayer Sav. (Oct. 13, 2011) 
http://nysac.org/news/county-voices/county-executives-mangano-and-levy-announce-
second-joint-purchase-to-achieve-millions-in-taxpayer-savings/ (“Bulk purchasing is just 
one of a myriad of ways to reduce costs for all taxpayers,” said County Executive Mangano.  
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Although they lost the election, Tom Suozzi’s and Howard 
Weitzman’s mission to solve the county’s long-standing special dis-
trict was a reminder of the solutions needed to solve the county’s 
structural problems, and the issue remains an important part to the 
county’s future. 
II.  A SURVEY OF INTERMUNICIPAL LAW IN NEW YORK STATE 
New York State law provides for consolidation, dissolution, and 
intermunicipal cooperation between local governments.  But while 
consolidation or dissolution might provide greater cost savings over 
time (although this has been disputed by some for the lack of empiri-
cal evidence),182 cooperative frameworks are inherently more nimble 
and involve fewer transaction costs.  This next section unpacks both 
frameworks as they are implemented in New York State, as well as 
the state’s implementation of the property tax cap, property tax freeze 
and local government grants in an attempt to incentivize more inter-
municipal activity. 
A. Consolidation and Dissolution After the New New 
York Government Reorganization and Citizen 
Empowerment Act 
The Reorganization and Citizen Empowerment Act allows for 
both consolidation and dissolution.183  The Act provides for two types 
of consolidation—”board initiated” by the entity itself and “voter ini-
 
“By working together, we can and will assist all municipalities in achieving cost-savings.”); 
see also LONG ISLAND PURCHASING COUNCIL, http://www.lipurchasingcouncil.org; Press Re-
lease, Comptroller Maragos: Special Dists. &Villages Should be Judged on Merit by their 
Local Cntys. (Mar. 23, 2009), 
http://archive.nassaucountyny.gov/agencies/Comptroller/specialdistrictspolicy.html (“‘The 
Comptroller’s Office will not be advocating broad consolidation or dissolution of special 
districts,’ said Comptroller Maragos.  ‘I have not seen any credible formal analysis that 
would support the wholesale consolidation of special districts and villages in Nassau Coun-
ty.’”). 
182 See Warner, infra note 328. 
183 The act is codified in N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW Art. 17-A; N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 
33-a.; N.Y. TOWN LAW § 57, 81, 174, 176, 195, 202-c, 208-b, 209-q; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 2-
254, 9-912; and N.Y. LOCAL FIN. LAW § 2.00, 24.00.  For an easy to read flowchart giving 
point by point analysis, see Andrew Cuomo, The New N.Y. Government Reogranization and 
Citizen Empowerment Act: A Summary of the Process for Consolidation and Dissolution, 
N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF STATE (June 2009) 2, 6, 11, 14, 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/ConsolidationDissolutionProcedures-summary.pdf 
[hereinafter Cuomo, Consolidation Summary Report]. 
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tiated” by referendum—and three types of dissolution—”board initi-
ated,” “voter initiated,” and “county initiated.”184  Additionally, not 
all government units may be dissolved or consolidated.  Lawmakers 
carved out exceptions for school districts, as well as special districts 
created by a county.185 
Under a consolidation framework, a local government unit can 
either be absorbed into another, or merged together to form an entire-
ly new unit.  Importantly, a local government unit cannot act unilat-
erally to consolidate.  It must find a partner.  In the case of voter-
initiated consolidation, the voters organizing the referendum must 
find the partners themselves.186  Both types of consolidation require a 
“joint consolidation agreement” with an accompanying impact 
study.187  To accomplish this, New York State suggests designating a 
 
184 Id. at 1, 5, 10, 13, 18. 
185 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 750(13). 
186 Cuomo, Consolidation Summary Report, supra note 183, at 5. 
187 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 750(12) (“Joint consolidation agreement” shall mean a written 
document that contains terms and information regarding the consolidation of two or more 
local government entities and that has been finalized and approved by the governing body or 
bodies of such entities pursuant to this article.”); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 752(2)(a)-(m).  
Any agreement must specify: 
(a) the name of each local government entity to be consolidated; (b) the 
name of the proposed consolidated local government entity, which name 
shall be such as to distinguish it from the name of any other like unit of 
government in the state of New York (except the name of any one of the 
entities to be consolidated); (c) the rights, duties and obligations of the 
proposed consolidated local government entity; (d) the territorial bound-
aries of the proposed consolidated local government entity; (e) the type 
and/or class of the proposed consolidated local government entity; (f) the 
governmental organization of the proposed consolidated local govern-
ment entity insofar as it concerns elected and appointed officials and 
public employees, along with a transitional plan and schedule for elec-
tions and appointments of officials; (g) a fiscal estimate of the cost of 
and savings which may be realized from consolidation; (h) each entity's 
assets, including, but not limited to, real and personal property, and the 
fair value thereof in current money of the United States; (i) each entity's 
liabilities and indebtedness, bonded and otherwise, and the fair value 
thereof in current money of the United States; (j) terms for the disposi-
tion of existing assets, liabilities and indebtedness of each local govern-
ment entity, either jointly, separately or in certain defined proportions; 
(k) terms for the common administration and uniform enforcement of lo-
cal laws, ordinances, resolutions, orders and the like, within the proposed 
consolidated local government entity, consistent with section seven hun-
dred sixty-nine of this title; (l) the effective date of the proposed consoli-
dation; and (m) the time and place or places for the public hearing or 
hearings on such proposed joint consolidation agreement pursuant to 
section seven hundred fifty-four of this title. 
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study group and bringing in public input early on into the process.188  
In cases of voter-initiated consolidation, this process would not start 
until after a successful referendum.189 
Board-initiated consolidation starts with a proposed resolution 
by all participating local government units.190  The proposed agree-
ment must be made readily available in a public place, posted on each 
municipality’s website.  The government units must provide a sum-
mary of the agreement in “a newspaper having a general circulation 
within each entity.”191  The publication is followed by a public hear-
ing in each entity.192  After the last public hearing, a municipality 
may decline or amend the agreement, in which the amendment must 
be agreed to by its partner government units and posted publicly as 
well.193 
Under the new law, if the parties to the board-initiated agree-
ment are only special districts then the entities do not need to hold a 
referendum.194  But if a party to the agreement is anything else, a ref-
erendum in each municipality must be held between 60-90 days from 
the time of the passing of the final agreement.195 
Awareness of the election is again an important feature at this 
stage with the law requiring publication of notice in a newspaper of 
general circulation four weeks before the referendum.  And im-
portantly, if the referendum fails, a new consolidation process may 
not be “initiated for the same purpose within four years of the date of 
such referendum.”196 
Voter-initiated consolidation involves a different procedural 
process and a great deal of coordination from actors outside the local 
governments involved.197  It starts with petitions for each government 
entity being consolidated, a model of which can be found in Section 
757(3).198  The petition must contain “at least 10 percent of the voters 
 
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 751(2)(a)-(m). 
188 Cuomo, Consolidation Summary Report, supra note 183, at 1. 
189 Cuomo, Consolidation Summary Report, supra note 183, at 5. 
190 Cuomo, Consolidation Summary Report, supra note 183, at 1. 
191 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 753(1)-(3) (McKinney 2016). 
192 Id. at § 754(1)-(2). 
193 Id. at § 754(3)-(4). 
194 Id. at § 755. 
195 Id. at § 758. 
196 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 759(4). 
197 Cuomo, Consolidation Summary Report, supra note 183, at 5. 
198 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 757(3). 
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in each government entity or 5000 signatures.”199  This petition is 
filed with the clerk of the town of the largest entity being consolidat-
ed.200  If there are a sufficient number of signatures, the local gov-
ernment entities affected must then have a referendum, with the same 
notice and time limitation requirements as with board-initiated con-
solidation.201  And as with board-initiated consolidation, if the refer-
endum fails, another one cannot occur for four years.202  But if the 
referendum succeeds, the affected government units must meet with-
in 30 days after the referendum’s certification and propose a joint-
consolidation plan.203  To complicate things further, voters may file a 
petition to require a second referendum within 45 days after the 
agreement is approved.204  This petition requires the signatures of ei-
ther 25 percent of voters, or 15,000 signatures in each entity—a high-
er percentage than the first referendum.205 
Importantly, because threatened local government officials can 
effectively halt voter-initiated consolidation through intentional inac-
tivity or impropriety, the law provides for court enforcement and ju-
dicial review at various points in the process.206  During the qualify-
ing-petition stage, a voter who signed the petition may seek judicial 
review if a town or village determines the petition has insufficient 
signatures.207  In cases where local officials fail to comply with a vot-
er-initiated consolidation, the Reorganization and Citizen Empower-
ment Act also provides for court-ordered consolidation.208  This pro-
cedure is invoked when governing bodies fail to “prepare and 
approve a dissolution plan” or are “unable or unwilling” to imple-
ment a consolidation.209  In these cases, “any five electors who 
signed” the consolidation petition may implement an Article 78 pro-
 
199 Id. at § 757. “[H]owever, that where the local government entity to be consolidated 
contains five hundred or fewer electors, the petition shall contain the signatures of at least 
twenty percent of the number of electors.” § 757(2). 
200 Id. at § 757(1). “[I]f one or more of the entities to be consolidated is a village the origi-
nal petition of electors from the village shall be filed with the clerk of the village.” 
201 Id. at § 758(3); § 758(1). 
202 Id. at § 759(4). 
203 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 760(1). 
204 Id. at § 763(2). 
205 Id. at § 763(3). 
206 Id. at § 980-h(c). 
207 Id. at § 757(6); 763(4). 
208 Cuomo, Consolidation Summary Report, supra note 183, at 14. 
209 Cuomo, Consolidation Summary Report, supra note 183, at 5, 14. 
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ceeding.210  Under Section 764, state courts not only have the power 
to order consolidation when resisted, but can order mediations and 
appoint a judicial hearing officer to supervise.211 
Board-initiated and voter-initiated dissolution have nearly iden-
tical procedures to their counterparts and require a similar thorough 
implementation plan. 212 
The Reorganization and Empowerment Act also provides for 
one additional procedure called county-initiated dissolution, in which 
the legislative body of a county has the power to abolish any unit of 
local government entirely within its boundaries.213  Before the law, 
counties had the ability to delegate functions among governmental 
units.214  Now under the new provision, a county can dissolve a gov-
ernmental unit when all of its functions have been transferred, and 
therefore the unit has no further obligation.215  That said, a county 
may not dissolve a governmental unit without the approval of voters 
by referendum.  The dissolution must not only receive a majority of 
votes within the affected municipality, but a majority of voters in the 
county.216 
Success under the Government Reorganization and Citizen Em-
powerment Act has been limited.  As of 2012, five villages in the 
state have approved dissolution—Altmar, Perrysburg, East Randolph, 
Randolph, and Seneca Falls.217  Notably, none of these dissolutions 
occurred on Long Island.  And as expected, there have been more 
failures than successes in that period: the villages of Whitesboro, Cu-
ba, Farnham, Lakewood, North Collins, Odessa, Sloan and Williams-
ville, as well as the villages Brockport and Port Henry, which at-
 
210 Cuomo, Consolidation Summary Report, supra note 183, at 5, 14.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. Art. 
78 codifies original writs of mandamus and prohibition into a statutory civil cause of action 
and civil proceeding against public officials. 
211 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § § 764(1), (3). 
212 Id. at § 773-90.  The requirements for proposed dissolution plans are outlined in § 774. 
213 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 33-a (McKinney 2016). 
214 Cuomo, Consolidation Summary Report, supra note 183, at 18. 
215 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 33-a. 
216 Id.  Further, if the dissolution affects the duties of other municipalities, those affected 
municipalities must also approve. Id. 
217 Anderson, Dissolving Cities, supra note 35, at Appendix A, 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/121.5.anderson_appendices.pdf.  Profes-
sor Anderson’s appendices are mightily useful for this discussion.  It appears quite difficult 
to capture the number of dissolutions and failed attempts.  Curiously enough, while her ap-
pendices are labeled “Approved Dissolutions 1857 2010,” the appendices themselves con-
tain entries after 2010. 
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tempted dissolution in both 2009 (under the old law), and 2010 under 
the new law.218 
B. Cooperative Frameworks Under New York State 
Law 
Like consolidation and dissolution, intermunicipal cooperation 
through intermunicipal agreements and shared services requires legal 
authority.  Although a creature of contract, intermunicipal coordina-
tion is specifically laid out in New York’s Constitution allowing a 
municipality to achieve its obligations by engaging with another gov-
ernmental unit: 
Local governments shall have power to agree, as au-
thorized by act of the legislature, with the federal gov-
ernment, a state or one or more other governments 
within or without the state, to provide cooperatively, 
jointly or by contract any facility, service, activity or 
undertaking which each participating local govern-
ment has the power to provide separately.  Each such 
local government shall have power to apportion its 
share of the cost thereof upon such portion of its area 
as may be authorized by act of the legislature.219 
 
218 Id. at Appendix B. 
219 N.Y. Const. Art. IX, § 1(c).  In addition Art. VIII, Section 1 provides for shared ser-
vices in local government finance: 
[T]wo or more such units may join together pursuant to law in providing 
any municipal facility, service, activity or undertaking which each of 
such units has the power to provide separately.  Each such unit may be 
authorized by the legislature to contract joint or several indebtedness, 
pledge its or their faith and credit for the payment of such indebtedness 
for such joint undertaking and levy real estate or other authorized taxes 
or impose charges therefor subject to the provisions of this constitution 
otherwise restricting the power of such units to contract indebtedness or 
to levy taxes on real estate.  The legislature shall have power to provide 
by law for the manner and the proportion in which indebtedness arising 
out of such joint undertakings shall be incurred by such units and shall 
have power to provide a method by which such indebtedness shall be de-
termined, allocated and apportioned among such units and such indebt-
edness treated for purposes of exclusion from applicable constitutional 
limitations, provided that in no event shall more than the total amount of 
indebtedness incurred for such joint undertaking be included in ascer-
taining the power of all such participating units to incur indebtedness.  
Such law may provide that such determination, allocation and appor-
tionment shall be conclusive if made or approved by the comptroller.  
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In addition, the General Municipal Law codifies the state’s plenary 
grant of authority to allow local governments to meet their needs 
through collaborative schemes.220  This enabling statute—Article 5-
G—allows any number of local government entities to share respon-
sibilities through two different types of “joint service” agreements.221  
The first is where one or more municipalities jointly perform a ser-
vice by pooling resources together.222  The second type is a “provid-
er-recipient” agreement where one municipality performs a service 
for another.223 
The statute places few restrictions on local governments enter-
ing into agreements.  One limitation is that a local entity may only 
participate in an agreement for those functions that it was empowered 
to perform individually.224  The second restriction is that each munic-
ipal entity must have approved the agreement by at least a majority 
vote.225  Third, the law requires due process measures if such a meas-
ure would be normally required to carry out the service.226 
Interestingly, Article 5-G does not require an agreement be 
committed to writing (although the Comptroller’s Office strongly 
recommends this and with good reason: “[m]ore than one-fifth of 
sharing arrangements are informal understandings between local offi-
cials”).227  But it does enumerate several areas where an agreement 
may have specified provisions, provides for a default term of five 
 
This provision shall not prevent a county from contracting indebtedness 
for the purpose of advancing to a town or school district, pursuant to 
law, the amount of unpaid taxes returned to it. 
N.Y. Const. Art. VIII, § 1. For an informative write up on legal authority for intermunicipal 
cooperation read OFFICER OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER, INTERMUNICIPAL 
COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION: EXPLORING OPPORTUNITIES FOR SAVINGS AND IMPROVED 
SERVICE DELIVERY 15-17 (2007) 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/cooperation1.pdf [hereinafter 
COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION]. 
220 Id. 
221 See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-m—o. 
222 COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, supra, note 219, at 15. 
223 Id. 
224 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o(1); see COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, supra note 
219, at 15. 
225 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o(1); see COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, supra note 
219, at 15. 
226 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o(1); see COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, supra note 
219, at 15. 
227 COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, supra note 219, at 16. A REFORM THAT WORKS, 
infra note 331, at 1. 
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years, and a residual clause for anything “reasonably necessary and 
proper to effectuate and progress the joint service.”228 
While Section 119-o allows for wide latitude for intermunicipal 
agreements, it does require a degree of specificity for “mutual sharing 
plans” (or shared service agreements) including describing (1) the 
necessary officers and employees required to execute the agreement, 
(2) “any limitations on joint services that may be rendered” as a result 
of the plan, and (3) providing notice to the necessary governing bod-
ies.229  Mutual sharing plans also require that a service receiver be 
“liable and responsible” to the service provider for its share of the 
service.230 
New York law allows the creation not only of intermunicipal 
agreements between local government units, but also new entities to 
create in planning and cost purchasing called “intergovernmental re-
lations councils.”231  These councils are central forums and can con-
tain any combination of local governmental units.232  Councils must 
also adopt bylaws, and elect a chairman, secretary, along with other 
necessary officers.233  Section 239-n legally empowers these councils 
to conduct research and studies as well as being a central hub for co-
operative purchasing, among other powers.234  Intergovernmental re-
 
228 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o(2)(a)-(m); see COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, su-
pra, note 219, at 16. The Comptroller’s office paraphrased the various provisions suggested: 
(1) “A method or formula for equitably allocating revenues and costs;” (2) “[t]he manner of 
employing and compensating personnel;” (3) “[t]he acquisition, ownership, custody, opera-
tion, maintenance, and lease and sale of property;” (4) “[t]he manner of handling any liabili-
ties that might be incurred in the operation of the joint service and obtaining adequate insur-
ance coverage;” (5) “[c]ustody by the fiscal officer of one of the participants of any or all 
moneys made available for expenditure for the joint service, and authorize for that fiscal of-
ficer to make payments on audit of the auditing official or body of his or her municipal cor-
poration or district;” (6) “[p]eriodic review of the agreement, including terms relating to its 
duration, extension or termination;” and (8) “[a]djudication of disputes or disagreements.” 
COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, supra note 219, at 16. 
229 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o(3)(a); COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, supra note 
219, at 16. 
230 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-o(3)(b); COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, supra note 
219, at 16. 
231 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 239-n; see COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, supra note 
219, at 17. 
232 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 239-n; see COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, supra note 
219, at 17. 
233 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 239-n. 
234 Id.  Under § 239-n, all of the powers of intergovernmental councils are: 
[a.] Make surveys and studies and conduct research programs to aid in 
the solution of local governmental problems and in efforts to improve 
administration and services; [b.] Provide for the distribution of infor-
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lations councils have been used in a variety of ways to increase col-
laboration among municipalities.235 
Surprisingly enough, even with the vast freedom New York’s 
intermunicipal coordination law provides, case law arising under § 
119 is sparse.  New York courts have determined that municipal po-
lice forces have jurisdiction where they engage in joint protection 
agreements.236  They’ve also determined that even when a municipal 
corporation is comprised of consortiums of local government, it still 
retains its legal status and protections as a municipal corporation.237  
These decisions appear to be quite intuitive.  For example, a consoli-
dated joint police officer board would have the ability to hire and fire 
 
mation resulting from such surveys, studies and programs; [c.] Consult 
and cooperate with appropriate state, municipal and public or private 
agencies in matters affecting municipal government; [d.] Devise practi-
cal ways and means for obtaining greater economy and efficiency in the 
planning and provision of municipal services and make recommenda-
tions in accordance therewith; [e.] Promote the general commercial, in-
dustrial and cultural welfare of the participating municipalities; [f.] Oth-
erwise promote strong and effective local government, public health, 
safety, morals and general welfare by means of local and intercommuni-
ty planning or performance of municipal services. [g.] Employ such per-
sons and adopt such rules and regulations as shall be necessary and 
proper to effectuate the purposes of this section; [h.] Provide a forum for 
local governments to explore and develop areas for municipal coopera-
tive activities pursuant to article five-G of this chapter; [i.] Operate as a 
purchasing consortium, where authorized by participating municipalities, 
for the purpose of obtaining economies through joint bidding and pur-
chasing; [j.] Purchase and make available to participating municipalities, 
where authorized by participating municipalities, goods and equipment, 
including but not limited to computer hardware and software; [and] [k.] 
Gather and make available information on surplus goods and equipment 
for sale or lease. 
235 See, e.g., Part III infra talking about the Long Island Purchasing Council, Long Island 
Water District Commissioner’s Association and Nassau BOCES. 
236 Old Brookville Policeman's Benev. Ass'n, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Muttontown, 
942 N.Y.S.2d 323, 326 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); People v. Greenfield, 808 N.Y.S.2d 919 (Jus-
tice Court, Village of Muttontown, New York 2005). 
237 Madison-Oneida-Herkimer Consortium v. North American Administrators, Inc., 765 
N.Y.S.2d 184, 189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (citing Matter of Passino v. Jefferson–Lewis School 
Employees Healthcare Plan, 716 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2000) (“municipal 
cooperative health benefit plan created [under] § 119–o was an ‘agency’ subject to Freedom 
of Information Law requests because it was created to benefit public employers”); American 
Ref–Fuel Co. of Niagara, L.P. v. Northeast Southtowns Waste Management Board, 737 
N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2002) (“contract dispute between waste hauler and 
municipal consortium for waste management created [under] § 119–o concerned a ‘public 
contract’)); Rice v. Cayuga-Onondaga Healthcare Plan, 599 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 4th Dep’t 1993). 
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employees.238  Additionally, courts have occasionally enforced statu-
tory requirements of these intermunicipal agreements when they have 
been insufficient.239 
C. The Property Tax Cap And Property Tax Freeze 
1. The Property Tax Cap 
The Property Tax Cap is a rather simple “blunt” force instru-
ment.240  Section 3-c of New York’s General Municipal law imposes 
a cap on a municipal government’s tax levy by the lesser of “(i) one 
and two one-hundredths; or (ii) the sum of one plus the inflation fac-
tor; provided, however, that in no case shall the levy growth factor be 
less than one.”241  And while two percent is a nice round number, ac-
cording to the Comptroller the ladder inflation factor formulation will 
most likely be the limit imposed year to year.242  The final number is 
also augmented by a series of exceptions including the growth of the 
tax base, school district capital expenditures, shared service agree-
ments, consolidation or dissolution of the government within the fis-
cal year and creation of a new government.243  Additionally, the rate 
for each local government is calculated by the New York State 
Commissioner of Taxation.244 
However, it is up to the local government to come up with its 
budget.  And if the local government wants to, it may “pierce” the 
cap with a vote of 60 percent of its members.245  School districts are 
an exception, with “voting strength” being the yearly school budget 
vote.246 
 
238 Thompson v. Lent, 383 N.Y.S.2d 929,, 932 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1976) 
239 Town of Oneonta v. City of Oneonta, 594 N.Y.S.2d 838, 838-839 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d 
Dep’t 1993). 
240 E.J. MCMAHON, THE CASE FOR THE CAP: WHY AND HOW IT CAN WORK IN NEW YORK 3 
(Empire Center 2011) http://www.empirecenter.org/publications/the-case-for-a-cap/.  
241 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 3-c. (2011) (effective June 26, 2015). 
242 Thomas P. DiNapoli, Three Years of the Tax Cap: Impact On School Districts, NEW 
YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER (2015), 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/snapshot/schooldistricttaxcap0215.pdf 
[hereinafter THREE YEARS OF THE TAX CAP]. 
243 Id. 
244 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 3-c (2011) (effective June 26, 2015). 
245 THREE YEARS OF THE TAX CAP, supra note 242. 
246 Ibid; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2023. (2011).  Curiously enough, Section 2023 was unsuccess-
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While the Property Tax Cap has been considered a success by 
its political proponents, it has its detractors.  One commentator was 
frustrated that the law “doesn’t exclude from the computation of the 
previous year’s tax levy amount, repayment of principal and interest 
on previously issued general obligation municipal bonds . . .” and 
doesn’t exclude “repayment of principal and interest on previously 
issued revenue bonds.”247  Other frustrations have been that the cap 
does not deal with a larger structural problem of federal and state un-
funded mandates that municipalities are obligated to perform.248 
The most overarching concerns about property tax caps are 
whether they achieve equitable aims and also whether municipalities 
can maintain the same level of service delivery under their con-
straints.  A property tax cap is not a new idea. There are at least 21 
states with some form of the device.249  The first kind of property tax 
cap was passed in 1978 by California’s voters as part of a “tax revolt” 
movement that swept the country during the late 1970s and 1980s.250  
In passing Proposition 13, California’s voters instituted a cap on the 
property tax levy, and instituted a cap on how much a property could 
be assessed by.251  New York City and Nassau County have their own 
versions of the assessment cap.252  An assessed home value cannot 
increase by more than 6 percent in any one year, or more than 20 per-
cent over a five year period.253 
Assessment caps can be problematic for a few reasons.  The 
first is when and if at all to reassess properties when they are sold.254  
 
fully challenged as violating the New York State Constitution; New York State United 
Teachers ex rel. Iannuzzi v. State, 993 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. 2014). 
247 Kenneth S. Kamlet, Land Banking, Tif Amendments, And The Tax Cap: What The 
Heck Do They Have In Common?, 85 N.Y. ST. B.J. 30, 35 (May, 2012). 
248 Patricia E. Salkin & Charles Gottlieb, Engaging Deliberative Democracy At The 
Grassroots: Prioritizing The Effects Of The Fiscal Crisis In New York At The Local Gov-
ernment Level, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 727, 744-55 (2012). 
249 Andrew T. Hayashi, Property Taxes and Their Limits: Evidence From New York City, 
25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 37-38 n.4 (2014) (citing MARK HAVEMAN & TERRI A. 
SEXTON, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POL’Y, PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT LIMITS 11 (2008), 
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/1412_Property-Tax-Assessment- Limits.). 
250 MCMAHON, supra note 240. 
251 Hayashi, supra note 249, at 37-38. 
252 MCMAHON, supra note 240. 
253 N.Y. RP Tax LAW § 1805; (1981) (effective June 22. 2010); see O’Shea v. Board of 
Assessors of Nassau County, 864 N.E.2d 1261(N.Y. 2007). 
254 See Hayashi, supra note 249, at 37-38. (explaining how both California and Florida 
“permit annual adjustments to assessed values at the lower of a specified rate and the rate of 
inflation,” but resetting the market value can discourage “long time home owners from mov-
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The second is that assessment caps can redistribute property tax bur-
dens as home prices unevenly increase, which generally tends to ben-
efit more valuable properties over less valuable ones.255 
New York’s property tax cap on the other hand is not an as-
sessment cap, and is most similar to Massachusetts’ cap, which limits 
the total amount of revenues that can be collected.256  Proposition 2½ 
gets its name from its 2.5% municipal tax cap.257  And similar to New 
York’s cap, the cap can be overridden by a majority vote.258  Detrac-
tors of the Massachusetts cap cite an increase in reliance on state 
aid.259  On the other hand, proponents of the Massachusetts cap tout 
the roughly forty percent success rate of cap overrides as evidence of 
meaningful choice for residents, and that that the cap has not caused 
services to deteriorate.260  For example, despite over two decades of 
the tax limitation, proponents cite Massachusetts’s schools rank 
among the best in the nation and still spend well above the national 
average per pupil.261 
It is difficult to determine the results of New York State’s prop-
erty tax cap given its relative infancy and that the State Comptroller 
only has limited data available.  The Comptroller has found that 
property tax levy growth has slowed since the enactment of the prop-
erty tax cap.262  But that slowdown could be attributed to residual ef-
fects of the housing market collapse and “citizen concerns over the 
high tax burden even before the property tax cap was enacted.”263 
 
ing out” because of the large increase in taxes they would experience if they were to move 
homes, and New York and Nassau’s assessment cap on the other hand does not reset values 
upon the sale of the home.). 
255 Hayashi, supra note 249, at 37-51 (finding the benefits accrued from New York City’s 
assessment cap go to the most valuable properties in the city). Hayashi, supra note 249, at 
45-46. 
256 Hayashi, supra note 249, at 37-38 n.14 (citing Property Tax Limitation in Massachu-
setts, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 313 (1999)); MCMAHON, supra note 240. 
257 M.G.L.A. LAWS 59, § 21C (1980) (effective Aug. 14, 2007). 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 See MCMAHON, supra note 240, at 13-14.  State aid as a percentage of local revenues 
increased from 28 percent in 1980 to 36 percent in 2005. Id. 
261 Id. at 13. (showing that Massachusetts schools spent $13,454 per pupil in 2008, the 
eighth highest in the nation). 
262 Thomas DiNapoli, 2014 Annual Report on Local Governments, OFFICE OF THE NEW 
YORK STATE COMPTROLLER at 4 (Jan. 2015), 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/datanstat/annreport/14annreport.pdf (“Property tax levy 
growth has slowed over the last several years, from a peak increase of 7.7 percent in local 
fiscal year ending (FYE) in 2003 to 2.0 percent aggregate increase in FYE 2013.”). 
263 Id. 
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2. The Property Tax Freeze 
Comparatively, the property tax freeze acts as an incentive to 
local governments rather than a constraint (although some taxpayers 
would probably like to tell their local government officials it’s a con-
straint!).  Under § 3-d of New York’s General Municipal Law, the 
property tax freeze is more specifically a real property tax credit that 
reimburses homeowners for the years increase in their property tax-
es.264 
Enacted in 2014, in the first year of the freeze, homeowners re-
ceive a reimbursement if their local government unit does not pierce 
the property tax cap.265  And in the second year, homeowners receive 
a tax credit if their local government is both compliant with the tax 
cap and additionally files an efficiency plan that is approved by the 
State Division of Budget.266  Approved efficiency plans demonstrate 
“three years of savings and efficiencies of at least one percent per 
year from shared services, cooperation agreements and/or mergers or 
efficiencies over the aggregate tax levies.”267  There is also incentive 
to submit plans jointly.  While local governments can submit individ-
ual plans, counties are encouraged to submit county-wide or regional-
wide plans to facilitate wider coordination.268 
D. Grants Lowering Transaction Costs of 
Intermunicipal Activity 
Municipal consolidation, dissolution, and coordination all ena-
ble local governments to reduce costs.  And New York State has ac-
tively sought in recent years to incentivize this behavior.269  Section 
54 of New York State Finance Law provides the legal framework for 
the Local Government Efficiency Grant and the Local Government 
 
264 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 3-d; see NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND 
FINANCE, NEW YORK STATE PROPERTY TAX FREEZE: FACTS SHEET (2014) 
http://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/publications/orpts/rp5301fs_prop_tax_facts.pdf.  Also important 
to know, the tax reimbursements are for homeowners that qualify under the STAR tax ex-
emption.  To qualify, the property must be the homeowner’s primary residence, have a total 
household income of $500,000 or less, and live outside of New York City’s boundaries. 
N.Y. TAX LAW § 606.(H) at (2)(i)(a) – (3)(ii)(a). 
265 N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 3-d(1). 
266 Id. at § 3-d. 
267 Id. at § 3-d(3). 
268 Id. at § 3-d(4). 
269 See N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 54. 
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Citizens Re-organization Empowerment Grant programs.270  Set forth 
in N.Y. Finance Law Section 54, both programs have been continual-
ly renewed by the state legislature.271 
III. ASSESSING NEW-REGIONALIST ASSUMPTIONS AND 
DEFINING THEMES OF INTERMUNICIPAL ACTIVITY 
A. “New Regionalist” Paradigms Can Achieve 
Equitable Aims 
According to Professor Michelle Wilde Anderson, “local gov-
ernment law as an academic field grew up amidst the postwar subur-
ban boom and the toll it took on older core cities.”272  Thus, much of 
the scholarship in the area tends to focus on the relationship between 
the suburb and its “central city.”273  Encircling this concept, scholar-
ship has sought to analyze intermunicipal cooperation from varying 
lenses.  Some from the lens of public choice theory,274 while other 
paradigms lay in the microeconomic decision making of the firm.275  
Still others look at the locality’s decision making as a problem of ra-
tional choice or game theory.276  Often prominent—at least in the 
economic discussion—is the idea of allocative efficiency among co-
ordination municipalities.277  For example, the level of service pro-
vided might be inefficient in one municipality, but can be mitigated 
by another locality’s assistance in order to reach the optimal level of 
service. 
And of course societal and political underpinnings play an im-
portant role in the discussion.  Many scholars that focus on suburb to 
 
270 Id. 
271 See id. 
272 Dissolving Cities, supra note 35, at 1428. 
273 Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization And Interlocal Bargains, N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 190 
n.1 [hereinafter Interlocal Bargains] (listing recent scholarship); see, e.g., Clayton P. Gil-
lette, The Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation, 21 J.L. & Pol. 365, 366 (2005)[hereinafter 
Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation]; Symposium on Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1 
(2000). 
274 See, e.g., Charles Tieboult, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POL. ECON. 
416 (1956). 
275 See, e.g., Interlocal Bargains, supra note 273. 
276 See, e.g., Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation, supra note 273; Richard Briffault, Our 
Localism (pts. 1-2), 90 COLUM. L REV. 1, 346 (1990) [hereinafter Our Localism]. 
277 See, e.g., Interlocal Bargains, supra note 273, at 210. 
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city interaction conclude or start off with the underlying assumption 
that suburbs exploit their poorer metropolitan neighbors.278  Howev-
er, some scholars in the field have recently taken a more nuanced ap-
proach, finding that high-poverty concentration is just as likely to oc-
cur in suburbs too.279  For example, “white flight, population loss, 
and economic abandonment” in rustbelt cities like Detroit and Buffa-
lo are more accurately explained through a binomial suburb-city 
framework,280 while New York City’s relationship with Long Island 
in 2015 should more likely be explained through a different paradigm 
as both New York City and its suburbs have evolved.  On the other 
hand, shades of Federalism lurk in the background in explaining the 
current dominant institutional order.281 And others cite Montesquieu 
to support theories that decentralized local government produces an 
efficient distribution of the desired level of services in any given lo-
cality.282 
Although the scholarship is diffuse with varying theoretical 
frameworks, there is a recurring set of concerns when thinking about 
institutional design.  The first concern is what form of government 
organization is the most optimal yet also politically attainable?  That 
debate has been defined by three paradigms: localism, regionalism, 
and “new regionalism” (essentially trying to adopt the principle of 
regionalism while working within a localism framework).283  The se-
cond concern is the ordinal priority of the institutional design: effi-
ciency versus equity.  This concern is also sometimes predicated on 
the two virtues being mutually exclusive.284 
 
278 See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at 
the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095 (2008) [hereinafter Cities Inside Out]; Ashira 
Pelman Ostrow, Emerging Counties? Prospects for Regional Governance in the Wake of 
Municipal Dissolution, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 187, 189-91 (2013). 
279 Richard Briffault, Localism And Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2000) 
(“[T]he concentration of poverty in a relative small number of metropolitan area consensus 
tracts is not a product solely of the local government system. Much broader economic and 
social factors are at work. . . . But the local government system contributes to the problem.”). 
280 See Dissolving Cities, supra note 35, at 1430 for a discussion on defining the city-
suburb relationship as scholarship has developed. 
281 See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional 
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L REV. 57, 91-117 (1999) 
282 Interlocal Bargains, supra note 273, at 208; see generally Robert P. Inman & Daniel 
L. Rubinfeld, The Political Economy of Federalism, in Perspectives on Public Choice 73, 
83-85 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997). 
283 Ostrow, supra note 278, at 187; Briffault, Localism And Regionalism, supra note 279. 
284 Ostrow, supra note 278, at 187; but see Briffault, Localism And Regionalism, supra 
note 279. 
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Localism is the idea that having many dispersed and small local 
governments is most optimal in allocating resources and setting local 
policy, including land use, taxes, and providing services.285 Professor 
Briffault has identified three arguments for decentralization of power 
in a given region: efficiency, democracy and community.286  The ef-
ficiency argument originated with public choice theorist Charles Tie-
bout who saw local government and service delivery as a public 
good.  The more local governments, the more consumer choice, and 
more consumer choice means the more efficient sorting of people in-
to localities when it comes to how much someone is willing to pay.287  
Another way of putting it, decentralization allows for maximum effi-
ciency.  The second and third arguments for localism are that it pro-
vides for more citizen democracy and stronger communities because 
of greater homogeny in shared values.288 
On the other hand, regionalism recognizes that people don’t 
necessarily act day to day within their locality and actually most like-
ly interact with a much larger community of people.  Proponents of 
regionalism seek to establish formal regional governments that have 
jurisdictional power over their smaller municipal units.289  From this 
perspective, proponents see the region as “a real economic, social and 
ecological unit.”290  It is not localities that determine the housing 
market, or the labor market, but the larger region collectively.  And 
especially in today’s inter-connected world, a regional system can 
implement policies adapting to the conditions of the global econo-
my.291  The most common pure regionalist approach is large-scale 
consolidation in favor of straightforward centralization of services.292 
But, regionalism’s virtues must confront the existing order of 
governmental organization.  This is because regions for the most part 
 
285 Briffault, Localism And Regionalism, supra note 279. 
286 Id. 
287 Id. (citing Charles Tieboult, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POL. ECON. 
416 (1956)). 
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Briffault, Localism And Regionalism, supra note 279, at 3-4. 
291 Id. at 5. 
292 Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1766-91 
(2002) (discussing the quest for regional government); DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT 
SUBURBS 3 (2d ed. 1995) (“Having a metropolitan government is much better than trying to 
get multiple local governments to act like a metropolitan government.  The former is a more 
lasting and stable framework for sustained, long-term action.”). 
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tend to “lack formal legal or political existence.”293  As seen in Nas-
sau County and throughout New York State and the nation, regional-
ism in most instances has been met with “insurmountable political 
opposition.”294 
Once popular in the 1960s and 1970s but falling out of vogue 
for practicality, national scholarly interest in regionalism increased 
again in the 1990s due to a proliferation in land development around 
major metropolitan areas, and an increase in high-poverty concentrat-
ed communities.295  In the late 1980s and 1990s, land use regulation 
in the form of exclusionary zoning increased suburban sprawl, creat-
ing a “leap frog” pattern of communities out into metropolitan ex-
urbs.296  And a corollary to the sprawl was concentrated poverty.297  
According to Professor Briffault, high poverty areas require more 
municipal services, increasing taxes on an already small tax base 
while producing low service quality.298  Those who could leave high 
poverty areas did.  And by the 1990s concentrated poverty was not 
only located in the cities, but was a problem in “inner suburbs” as 
well.299  That said, high-concentration of poverty is not solely caused 
by sprawl although sprawl is a very significant factor in the equa-
tion.300 
It is indeed the case that Long Island today still suffers from the 
pernicious effects of home-owning policies during America’s post-
war suburban boom, perpetuated by the Federal Housing Administra-
tion and carried out by developers like Mr. Levitt.301  African Ameri-
cans post-war were denied the opportunity to buy homes in many de-
velopments across Long Island, leading to many of the boundaries 
and demographic concentrations we have today.302  And decades later 
 
293 Id. (citing DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 3 (2d ed. 1995)). 
294 Ostrow, supra note 278, at 187; Dissolving Cities, supra note 35, at Appendix A 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/121.5.anderson_appendices.pdf. 
295 Ostrow, supra note 278, at 187; Briffault, Localism And Regionalism, supra note 279, 
at 10-14. 
296 Id. 
297 Briffault, Localism And Regionalism, supra note 279, at 10-14. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. 
301 See Marc Seitles, The Perpetuation Of Residential Racial Segregation In America: 
Historical Discrimination, Modern Forms Of Exclusion, And Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 89 (1998). 
302 See Amanda Tillotson, Race, Risk And Real Estate: The Federal Housing Administra-
tion And Black Homeownership In The Post World War II Home Ownership State, 8 
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key economic indicators show that there is still more work that must 
be done: “Blacks and Hispanics constitute 90 percent of students in 
high-poverty schools but only 23 percent in schools with medium 
poverty rates and 9 percent in schools with low-poverty rates.”303  
This concentration also correlates with graduation rates.304  Further-
more, statistical findings do support the assumption that municipali-
ties with similar neighbors share more, leaving those poorer munici-
palities that might benefit the most from sharing behind.305 
But while regionalists in the 1990s recognized the benefits cen-
tralization could provide, they also recognized the infeasibility of a 
pure regionalist solution.  And so in regionalism’s stead came “new 
regionalism.”306  Under a new regionalist framework, regionalist so-
lutions of central decision-making were sought using existing munic-
ipal structures.307  Many new regionalists believe that cooperation 
among municipalities would be induced not because of virtues of eq-
uity but because lacking coordination would cause more harm than 
not.308  But many detractors have lamented that the pragmatism of 
new regionalism only benefits efficiency goals and not equity ones.309  
An efficiency regionalism paradigm ignores structural problems in-
cluding race and socioeconomic issues.  Local governments today re-
inforce these inequities by resisting initiatives that attempt to solve 
 
DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. Just. 25 (2014). 
303 LONG ISLAND INDEX 2012 PROFILE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4; see also John Hilde-
brand & Joie Tyrrell, Long Island, NYS high school graduation rates rise in 2014, NEWSDAY 
(Dec 18, 2014 at 10:59PM) http://www.newsday.com/long-island/long-island-nys-high-
school-graduation-rates-rise-in-2014-1.9729087 (chart showing graduation rates of schools). 
304 Id. 
305 BINGXI QIAN & MILDRED WARNER, DO MUNICIPALITIES SHARE SERVICES WITH POORER 
NEIGHBORS? FACTORS EXPLAINING LEVELS OF SERVICE SHARING AMONG MUNICIPALITIES IN 
NEW YORK STATE (Nov. 2014) 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/mildredwarner.org/attachments/000/000/470/original/1c4257ef315
f77acb2e5618229499b0f (Professor Warner found that “average sharing level among local 
municipalities within the same county correlates with income inequality.”). 
306 See Ostrow, supra note 278, at 187 (citing Frug, supra note 292, at 1786-87); see also 
DAVID RUSK, INSIDE GAME/OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING URBAN 
AMERICA (1999) [hereinafter Inside Game/Outside Game]; Todd Swanstrom, What We Ar-
gue About When We Argue About Regionalism, 23 J. URB. AFF. 479, 492 (2001) (“The new 
regionalists have for the most part given up the ideal of forming powerful general-purpose 
regional governments.”). 
307 See Ostrow, supra note 278, at 187; Lisa T. Alexander, The Promise and Perils of 
“New Regionalist” Approaches to Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 
641-42 (2011). 
308 See Ostrow, supra note 278, at 187 (citing Swastrom, supra note 306, at 492). 
309 Id. at 190-92; Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39 
URB. LAW. 483, 517 (2007). 
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societal imbalances or in the lack of initiative resist sub silentio by 
maintaining their boundaries.  But nonetheless, these same munici-
palities are willing to engage in initiatives that produce efficiency in 
the cost of service such as joining others to create an economy of 
scale.310 
That doesn’t mean all is for naught when it comes to a collabo-
rative approach among Nassau’s municipalities.  While it is easy to 
dismiss an intermunicipal cooperation paradigm as insufficient,311 
equity in our county still remains a valence issue with a menu of so-
lutions available to achieve it.312  And for that matter, regionalist 
frameworks implemented in other comparable counties have not nec-
essarily resulted in equity gains.313  Collaborative policies ultimately 
remain politically viable and scholarship has suggested some ways 
they can be tailored to achieve equitable aims.314  And it should not 
 
310 Ostrow, supra note 278, at 187; Reynolds, supra note 309, at 6-7; Frug, supra note 
287, at 1787-88. 
311 Professor Ostrow believes that there is a “paradox of regionalism: effective regional 
structures are not politically viable, and politically viable regional structures are not effec-
tive.” Ostrow, supra note 278, at 187. 
312 See Scott A. Bollens, Concentrated Poverty And Metropolitan Equity Strategies, 8 
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 11 (1997); see generally Donald E. Stokes, Spatial Models of Party 
Competition, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 368, 373 (1963) (discussing the framework of a “valence 
issue.”). 
313 Montgomery County Public Schools despite being one unified school district still have 
significant achievement gap issues along racial lines.  In a 2014 report, the school system 
found that “economic, racial, and ethnic stratification of students” in its schools had in-
creased, citing “specifically, the share of Black and Latino students in MCPS’ consortia and 
consortia-like high schools grew while the share of White, Asian, and non-FARMS students 
in MCPS’ low-poverty non-consortia high schools grew.” ELAINE BONNER-TOMPKINS, 
OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, PERFORMANCE OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS’ HIGH SCHOOLS—A FY 2014 UPDATE (2014) 
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/OLO/Resources/Files/OLO%20Report%202014-
7%20Final.pdf. Other pertinent statistics include: (1) “Students receiving free and reduced 
priced meals (FARMS) accounted for 2 in 5 students compared to 1 in 6 students among 
MCPS’ other, low-poverty non-consortia high schools;” (2) “Blacks and Latinos accounted 
for 2 in 3 students compared to less than 1 in 3 students among MCPS’ other high schools;” 
and (3) Whites and Asians accounted for 1 in 4 students compared to nearly 2 in 3 students 
among MCPS’ other high schools.”  Id. 
314 Bollens, supra note 312, at 15-19. Bollens discusses eleven “metropolitan equity strat-
egies” that can be accomplished through new regional frameworks: (1) channeling federally-
assisted housing expenditures to lessen racial concentration, (2) establishing a regional gov-
ernment campaign against residential segregation, (3) limiting regional urban sprawl, (4) re-
quiring “fair-share” affordable housing obligations, (5) encouraging balanced distribution of 
jobs and housing, (6) targeting regional transportation and redevelopment strategies, (7) 
modify development review to advantage distressed areas, (8) cite “locally unwanted land 
uses” based on equity criteria, (9) develop guidelines for local integration maintenance pro-
grams, (10) attack root fiscal reasons behind ineffective municipal planning, (11) link re-
49
Fishbein: 300 Governments
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
584 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
be forgotten that where sharing is least—in poorer and smaller com-
munities—there is the most room for reducing cost and improving 
service delivery.315 
B. Themes of Intermunicipal Activity 
1. “Faces of Municipal [Activity]” 
For these many reasons and more it is difficult to create a theo-
ry of intermunicipal activity that explains a large band of outcomes.  
One reason could be that municipal decision-making is not unilateral 
and usually requires the participation of multiple actors on any given 
side, escaping the principle of transitive decision-making.316  Another 
reason could be the inherent difficulty in creating a model that takes 
into account the numerous variables that policymakers make when 
evaluating the political costs of engaging in intermunicipal coordina-
tion.317  And another reason could be the lack of uniformity of home 
rule laws.  A lack of legal uniformity among states and among locali-
ties conceivably creates a variance in the barriers to entry and trans-
actions costs associated with intermunicipal activity.318 
Thus, it is simpler and more appropriate to identify themes of 
intermunicipal coordination rather than conditions to it.  Professor 
Michelle Anderson provides an excellent starting point with her 
 
gional and local equity strategies. Ibid. In addition, Professor Warner suggests a New York 
specific equity strategy: “differentiated state aid should be used to make higher need and 
higher cost municipalities more attractive as cooperation partners.” QIAN & MILDRED 
WARNER, supra note 305, at 6; see also Part IV.DVI.B. 
315 BINGXI QIAN & MILDRED WARNER, supra note 305, at 6. 
316 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits Of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 NW. 
U. L. REV. 4 (discussing the Virginia School and Arrow’s theorem in the context of public 
choice and theorizing that “the task of discovering and evaluating preferences is so filled 
with unverifiable assumptions and gaps that it cannot be described in any fashion other than 
as normative or even speculative. As a result, a complete legal policy can never be based on 
the policymaker's observations of the preferences of her constituency.”). 
317 Amnon Lehavi, Property Rights And Local Public Goods: Toward A Better Future For 
Urban Communities, 36 URB. LAW. 1, 97 (“It should be clear, in any case, that it is not feasi-
ble to design a universal formula that would equally apply to all types of local public goods. 
Thus, for new legal rules and remedies to be readily implemented, they must be constructed 
narrowly and precisely for different categories of local public goods.”) 
318 See Jonathan Rosenbloom, New Day At The Pool: State Preemption, Common Pool 
Resources, And Non-Place Based Municipal Collaborations, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 445, 
450-61 (2012). 
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“Faces of Municipal Dissolution.”319  In her elaborate and quite ex-
haustive study of municipal dissolution, Professor Anderson identi-
fied “[f]ive themes that repeatedly arise” in municipal dissolutions, or 
lack thereof: 
(1) decline (i.e., budgetary crisis and depopulation due 
to industrial or rural abandonment), (2) taxes, or more 
specifically, the rebellion against them, (3) reform to 
address corruption and mismanagement, (4) race, in 
settings ranging from banishment to autonomy to de-
segregation, and (5) community, or the desire to pre-
serve neighborly bonds and history.320 
Indeed, these five themes are quite applicable to intermunicipal coor-
dination and are present in instances of intermunicipal coordination 
throughout Nassau County. 
While there are surely thematic commonalities between dissolu-
tion and coordination, the difference in how the theme is present is 
likely a difference in the degree of the problem.  Because dissolution 
requires higher transaction and political costs compared to coordina-
tion, the themes might in some sense be more amplified when suc-
cessful dissolutions occur.  For example, a lower degree and immedi-
acy of a budgetary crisis—like Nassau County’s entering state 
receivership—has not produced urgency for dissolutions.  But fiscal 
stress on Nassau’s municipalities has meant localities have been more 
willing to engage and test the waters with intermunicipal coordina-
tion in areas such as cooperative purchasing.321 
Nassau County compared to the dissolution in Seneca Falls 
provides an interesting contrast.  When the village of Seneca Falls 
dissolved in 2010, the quaint community was quite different from the 
bustling industrial corridor it was at the famous Seneca Falls conven-
tion.322  And the numbers speak for themselves. In its proposed disso-
lution plan, the village touted an annual savings of $706,000 per 
year—a reduction in 7.8 percent of the town and village budgets 
combined.323  From a tax savings perspective, village taxpayers had 
 
319 Dissolving Cities, supra note 35, at 1399-1417. 
320 Id. at 1400. 
321 See infra Part IV.A.1 on the Long Island Purchasing Council. 
322 Anderson, Dissolving Cities, supra note 35, at 1372-75. 
323 DISSOLUTION STUDY COMMITTEE, VILLAGE OF SENECA FALLS DISSOLUTION PLAN 5 
(2009) 
https://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/LGEProjectReports/2008/SenecaFallsDissPlan.pdf. 
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an estimated decrease “from $16.93 per $1,000 of assessed value to 
$8.82 per $1,000 of assessed value, or a reduction of 48 percent.”324  
The campaign to dissolve Hempstead Sanitary District 2 on the other 
hand never suggested such savings.325 
Many ventures to collaborate in Nassau might have been 
brought on in part by fiscal stress—a short term to medium term 
problem.326  The Long Island Purchasing Council and BOCES back-
end services project grant in 2009 were both sought during the crux 
of the financial crisis, and had waning interest for further iterations in 
each case.327 
Thus, it is a logical assumption that Anderson’s themes of dis-
solution are also themes of cooperation, but just milder in the intensi-
ty for intermunicipal cooperation to take place. 
2. A New Theme: “Forced Efficiency” 
The advent of New York State’s property tax cap and the addi-
tion of the property tax freeze tethering tax credits to the former bring 
a new dynamic to the discussion.  The term “forced efficiency” as 
New York’s regional associations have called it is aptly put.328  When 
hard budgetary constraints like the property tax cap are applied, local 
officials have been obligated to operate within those constraints or 
face the political consequences.329 
Indeed, Professor Mildred Warner’s findings suggest that mu-
nicipalities statewide appear to be responding to the property tax cap.  
To get an idea of the pressure the property tax cap alone causes on 
municipalities, if the cap were in place from 2000-2011, local gov-
ernments staying within the cap would have made 23 percent less in 
 
324 Id. (“The projected tax reduction for a Village dwelling with a market value of 
$100,000 would be $810.69.”). 
325 See infra, Part IV.A.3. 
326 See OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER, FISCAL STRESS MONITORING 
SYSTEM RESULTS FOR 2013 CALENDAR YEAR ENTITIES (2014) 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/fiscalmonitoring/pdf/FSMSResultsFor2013Entities.pdf. 
327 See infra, Part IV.C. 
328 See Mildred Warner, Shared Services in New York State: A Reform that Works (slide 
presentation) Grace Under Pressure: Innovation in a Time of Forced Efficiencies Summit, 
(Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter slide presentation] 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/mildredwarner.org/attachments/000/000/444/original/36e977e457
6fd16d34930af6bf656d11. 
329 Id. 
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expenditures.330  In Professor Warner’s survey, responding munici-
palities reported that the three most common reasons for engaging in 
intermunicipal coordination were cost savings, fiscal stress, and 
maintaining service quality.331  Importantly, a majority of local gov-
ernments reported the tax cap was a moderate or significant contribu-
tor to their fiscal stress.332  That said the most popular response to fis-
cal stress was to raise user fees by 41 percent of respondents.  But 
shared services were the second most popular response at 34 percent.  
Of note, only 18 percent of municipalities said they would consider 
consolidation.333 
As for the tax freeze, the Comptroller has not had data available 
for municipalities and efficiency plans.  But 97 percent of school dis-
tricts during the first year of the freeze in fact levied “property taxes 
equal to or less than their respective tax levy limit.”334 
Anecdotally, it does appear that at least some municipalities 
prepared for the freeze.  In 2006 the Town of North Hempstead cre-
ated the Office of Intermunicipal Coordination (OIC).335  It is tasked 
with creating open lines of communication not only among villages 
and special districts, but also between the town and its local govern-
ment units.336  In the wake of the property tax freeze in 2014, the 
town has been using the office to engage mayors and special district 
commissioners to discuss cooperative opportunities in order for those 
mayors to create their government efficiency plans.337  Additionally, 
 
330 Id. 
331 HOMSY, BINGXI QIAN, YANG WANG & MILDRED WARNER, SHARED SERVICES IN NEW 
YORK STATE: A REFORM THAT WORKS 8 (2013), 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/mildredwarner.org/attachments/000/000/416/original/34bf106eb02
2022037f46a9fad5f042f [hereinafter “A REFORM THAT WORKS”]. 
332 Id. at 76. 
333 Id. at 8.  Additionally, only 22 percent of responding municipalities said they’ve re-
duced services and only 10 percent said they would eliminate services.  Municipal bankrupt-
cy was considered by less than one percent of respondents. Id. 
334 Id. at 12; THOMAS DINAPOLI, DINAPOLI FINDS SLOW PROPERTY TAX GROWTH FOR 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2015), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/jan15/010915a.htm. 
335 TOWN OF NORTH HEMPSTEAD, OFFICE OF INTERMUNICIPAL COORDINATION, ABOUT OCI 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2016), http://www.oicnorthhempsteadny.net/About.aspx 
336 Id. 
337 Lisa Irizarry, North Hempstead village mayors map strategies for sharing services, 
cutting costs NEWSDAY (Dec. 14, 2014 7:28 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-
island/towns/north-hempstead-village-mayors-map-strategies-for-sharing-services-cutting-
costs-1.9712548.  “Cuomo ‘used the carrot of tax cuts to bring together people who should 
have been talking about their common interests for a long time,’ said Lawrence Levy, head 
of the National Center for Suburban Studies at Hofstra University.”). 
53
Fishbein: 300 Governments
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2016
588 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 32 
the “Grace Under Pressure” summit put together by New York’s re-
gional associations shows the lengths regional associations are going 
to for greater collaboration as well.338 
Forced efficiency is also different from Anderson’s theme of 
tax rebellion.  A “tax revolt” movement for government dissolution 
usually involves a plebiscite.339  But New York State’s property tax 
cap and property tax freeze were legislative enactments.340  It is in-
deed the case that many property tax caps were enacted by referen-
dum, including California’s Proposition 13 and Massachusetts Propo-
sition 2 1/2.341  But New York’s property tax cap is not characterized 
as a tax revolt, nor was it passed during the tax revolt era.342  The cap 
was passed after years of exhaustive reports and analysis under two 
Governors.343  For that matter, the property tax freeze also does not 
appear to be a creature of tax revolt. 
Taking it all together, New York State’s forced efficiency poli-
cies to incentivize intermunicipal coordination in recent years sug-
gests a new theme in the vernacular of intermunicipal activity. 
IV. WHAT’S IN THE TOOL BOX? ASSESSING NEW YORK STATE’S 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORMS 
This final section evaluates the toolbox available for municipal 
activity.  I first evaluate the political viability of collaboration and 
consolidation and through polling data from Tom Suozzi’s 2013 
campaign conclude that collaboration is more politically viable than 
consolidation, at least at consolidation’s plebiscite stage—where 
more failures than successes have occurred.  I next evaluate the effec-
tiveness of collaborative centric policies being tethered to “forced ef-
ficiency” policies and conclude that the tactic could impede equity 
goals, and therefore should be reformulated to incentivize equity 
 
338 See generally NEW YORK STATE ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, GRACE UNDER PRESSURE: 
INNOVATION IN A TIME OF FORCED EFFICIENCIES (2014), 
http://www.nyssba.org/clientuploads/nyssba_pdf/ebrochure-summit-041614.pdf. 
339 See Dissolving Cities, supra note 35, at 1405. 
340 Ben Lane, New York Senate Passes Bill to Cap Property Taxes in New York City, 
HOUSINGWIRE (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/36204-new-york-senate-
passes-bill-to-cap-property-taxes-in-new-york-city. 
341 MARVIN F. POER AND CO. EPOER REPORT, ASSESSMENT AND REVENUE CAPS IN THE 
SPOTLIGHT  (2010), http://www.mfpoer.com/poer-report/2010/2010-07-assessment-revenue-
caps-spotlight.pdf. 
342 Id. 
343 See infra Part I.C. 
54
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/5
2016 300 Governments 589 
aims. Lastly, I talk about the effectiveness of grant programs and how 
training programs and designated officials for intermunicipal coordi-
nation can cut down information asymmetries to collaboration. 
A. The Case for Collaboration 
1. Cost Disparities and Inefficiencies in Special 
Districts Are Real and Savings Under 
Collaborative Frameworks can Produce 
Meaningful Gains 
Articulating how much can be saved and how much can be im-
proved through intermunicipal coordination is a tall order.  But there 
appears to be much we do know about coordination that we don’t 
necessarily know about consolidation.  At least one expert believes 
that while empirical research has shown cost savings through collab-
oration, the “research does not support claims of cost savings” for 
consolidation.344 
Professor Mildred Warner has accomplished an exhaustive ef-
fort in understanding intermunicipal coordination and overall service 
delivery in New York.  In 2013 she led an extensive survey partner-
ing with many of the regional associations that participated in the 
“Grace Under Pressure” summit.345  Warner found sharing services is 
in fact quite common among New York municipalities. With 29 dif-
ferent types of services measured, Warner found that municipalities 
shared services around 27 percent of the time.346  Promisingly munic-
ipalities reported cost savings 56 percent of the time, improved ser-
vice quality 50 percent of the time, and improved cross-jurisdictional 
service coordination 35 percent of the time.347  Professor Warner has 
identified administrative and support services as one of the most un-
derutilized avenues for shared services that has the biggest potential 
 
344 See A REFORM THAT WORKS, supra note 331, at 8.  “While there is pressure to consider 
consolidation, little has occurred to date and research does not support claims of cost sav-
ings.  In contrast, service sharing is widespread and does lead to cost savings and service 
quality improvements.”).” Id. But see William Duncombe & John Yinger, Does School Dis-
trict Consolidation Cut Costs?, SYRACUSE CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH 30 .”). 
345 See A REFORM THAT WORKS, supra note 331, at 1.  Warner’s survey received an over-
all response rate of 60 percent across all municipalities. Id. 
346 See id. at 1. 
347 See id. at 6. 
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for cost savings.348  In this category, municipalities reported cost sav-
ings 78 percent of the time.349  This suggests that further expansion 
could produce greater economies of scale.  And as Professor Warner 
has noted, the greatest area for improvement is in smaller or poorer 
communities that share the least.350  Additionally, former Comptroller 
Weitzman’s finding that service delivery did not appear to be corre-
lated with service cost also suggests collaboration can lower costs 
without affecting service delivery negatively.351 
That said, oversight and evaluation are certainly required in the 
process.  The Nassau Board of Cooperative and Educational Services 
(BOCES) is the county’s largest shared service program and has 
largely been hailed as a success, providing a range of joint education-
al as well as backdoor and administrative services for the county 
(each county in the state has a BOCES).352  However, a recent report 
questioned the competitiveness of bids for some items like furniture 
using BOCES vendors.353  The article reported that school superin-
tendents were aware of the problem, but would rather keep the large 
amount of state aid their schools receive from BOCES, than go out-
side the system for competitive bidding on mismatched items.354 
Furthermore, collaborative efforts must also be maintained.  In 
2010 Nassau and Suffolk entered into their first attempt at coopera-
tive purchasing to reduce costs across the county by forming the 
Long Island Purchasing Council.355  Its first bid was for 24,000 cases 
of multipurpose office paper.  The council’s initial membership was 
quite promising as well.356  But soon after the council’s initial incep-
 
348 Id. at 3.  For example, only 12 percent of municipalities engage in joint health insur-
ance, only 8 percent for professional staff, only 6 percent for liability insurance, and only 4 
percent in payroll and bookkeeping. See A REFORM THAT WORKS, supra note 331, at 3. 
349 See id. at 5. 
350 See id. at 7. 
351 See COST DISPARITIES IN SPECIAL DISTRICTS, supra note 129. 
352 SHARED SERVICES, CHRISTOPHER GLENN HAYES, MORE THAN CAREER EDUCATION: A 
BOCES PRIMER (2013), 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/mildredwarner.org/attachments/000/000/423/original/124313a5f2f
505667ba21c7c80246ef9. 
353 David Winzelberg, BOCES no bargain for LI taxpayers, LONG ISLAND BUSINESS NEWS 
(June 20, 2014) http://libn.com/2014/06/20/boces-no-bargain-for-li-taxpayers/. 
354 Id. 
355 Press Release, Suffolk County Executive, Landmark Agreement: Long Island Purchas-
ing Council Formed, (2010) 
https://suffolkcountyexecutive.wordpress.com/2010/10/21/landmark-agreement-long-island-
purchasing-council-formed/. 
356 The Town of Oyster Bay and Suffolk’s Town of Brookhaven joining at the council’s 
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tion enthusiasm waned.  To date the council has only made two pur-
chases, the initial paper purchase in 2010 and a joint purchase of 
wastewater treatment and pool chemicals in 2012, the latter saving 
the counties $1.1 million.357 
Although these two examples highlight some of the pitfalls of 
collaboration, sufficient oversight and evaluation along with main-
tained relationships among local leaders should help mitigate ineffi-
ciency and lack of continuity in sharing.  But, overall collaborative 
ventures have been shown to achieve economy of scale and provide 
cost savings year to year among municipalities. 
2.  Polling Data Show That “Collaboration” is a 
Politically Viable Position 
Juxtaposed to consolidation, intermunicipal coordination is 
widely assumed to be more politically viable.  Tom Suozzi in his 
2013 campaign gaves us a deep insight into that approach.  A syno-
nym to coordination is “collaboration,” and that word was an im-
portant point in Suozzi’s campaign message.  The last pillar of Suoz-
zi’s message was “collaboration,” and specifically that Suozzi would 
“cut waste by encouraging local governments to collaborate.”358  The 
following is a long form sound bite from one of the Suozzi cam-
paign’s internal polls: 
Tom Suozzi wants to cut waste in government by 
bringing Nassau County’s towns and villages together 
to find ways to collaborate on sharing costs. There are 
over 400 taxing entities in Nassau and Suozzi knows 
we can save millions of dollars every year by getting 
 
inception along with a handful of special districts. Id.  “Had Suffolk alone issued the bid its 
potential usage would have been approximately 15,000 cases, Nassau 8,000, Oyster Bay 750 
and Brookhaven 700, but because the Council is issuing the bid on behalf of all members the 
usage will be in excess of 24,000 cases per year.” Id.  According to Newsday, the counties 
saved $107,000 on the paper purchase. Glen Cove joins L.I. Purchasing Council, NEWSDAY 
(Jan. 12, 2011) http://www.newsday.com/long-island/towns/glen-cove-joins-l-i-purchasing-
council-1.2604522.  The City of Glen Cove joined at the beginning of 2011, and by the end 
of that year Nassau BOCES joined, adding its 56 member school districts and hoping to fur-
ther increase the range of joint purchasing efforts it was already engaged in.; John Callegari, 
Nassau BOCES joins LI Purchasing Council, LONG ISLAND BUSINESS NEWS (Oct. 24, 2011), 
http://libn.com/2011/10/24/nassau-boces-joins-li-purchasing-council/. 
357 John Callegari, LIPC saves counties $1M on chemicals, LONG ISLAND BUSINESS NEWS 
(Apr. 17, 2012) http://libn.com/2012/04/17/lipc-saves-counties-1m-on-chemicals/. 
358 Polling Data of Tom Suozzi taken by author (on file with author).  I greatly appreciate 
Tom Suozzi’s and Global Strategies’ help in lending me their insightful work. 
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county and local governments to work together and 
share expenses for things like computer systems, pay-
roll administration, and the maintenance of parks and 
roads.359 
Suozzi’s “collaboration” message polled at 46 percent, tied for 
the best among “positive vision messages.”360  The other best mes-
sage was about Nassau’s tax certiorari system: Suozzi’s “[p]lan to fix 
[the] assessment system will make sure commercial property owners 
pay fair share”361  According to Isaac Goldberg, campaign manager 
of Nassau County’s Democratic coordinated campaign in 2013, an 
ideal campaign message polls above 50 percent or “50+1”.362  While 
these messages polled below that ideal threshold, he still considered 
both messages viable positions that created added value to the cam-
paign’s messages. 
In contrast, the other seven “positive vision” messages polled 
below 40 percent.  These messages included two advocating for the 
development of “vibrant downtowns,” one on “rooting out corruption 
and patronage,” a message on “streamlining services,” one on ap-
pointing a “chief innovation officer,” as well as a message on “nego-
tiating underwater mortgages” and one about developing the Nassau 
Hub into a walkable destination for its surrounding colleges, busi-
nesses and communities.363 
According to Global Strategies, the polling firm for the cam-
paign, “collaboration” was a successful policy position because it was 
a smaller-scale idea.364  In contrast, “grand ideas” did not test well.365  
While Global Strategies did not poll on consolidation, it is likely it 
would not have polled well given, for one of many reasons, its grand 
vision appeal like the other positive vision messages tested. 
 
359 Id. 
360 Id. 
361 Id.  The long form message was: 
Tom Suozzi's plan to fix Nassau County's broken property tax assess-
ment system starts with making sure big commercial property owners 
pay their fair share. Instead of hassling individual homeowners, Suozzi 
will focus on getting accurate commercial assessments so big companies 
no longer win huge appeals that cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of 
dollars a year. 
362 Interview with Isaac Goldberg (on file with author). 
363 Global Strategies Statistical Data, taken by author (on file with author). 
364 Id. 
365 Id. 
58
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/5
2016 300 Governments 593 
That voters in Nassau County would prefer smaller-scale in-
cremental improvements to larger visions makes sense from a histori-
cal perspective.  The county’s political history is one of compromise.  
The majority of changes to its municipal structure have occurred only 
because of court ordered mandates and pressure from the state.366  
These changes only occurred because they were palatable to a popu-
lation aware of existing problems but wary of too much disruption.  
Another way of putting it: voters are risk averse. 
It is also important to note that collaboration has fewer political 
transaction costs than consolidation.  Professor Warner has found lo-
cal leadership and trust rank high as a factor for collaboration among 
reporting municipalities in her survey.367  In contrast, consolidation 
requires a plebiscite, which creates an additional political barrier than 
traditionally campaigning on and passing laws. 
3. Consolidation Does Not Appear to Be 
Politically Viable, At Least When Assessing 
Plebiscites 
Although it appears homeowners are risk averse in their voting 
preferences toward local government, they are extremely wary of 
high taxes.  A recent poll tracking residential satisfaction from the 
Long Island Index shows that in 2011, forty-one percent of Long Is-
land residents thought that high property taxes were an “extremely 
serious” problem in their county, while another 40 percent thought 
the problem was “very serious.”368  In addition, sixty-six percent of 
residents thought the problem of a lack of affordable housing on 
Long Island was either extremely serious or very serious.369  Even 
more intriguing, seventy-eight percent of people thought that it was 
either an extremely serious or a very serious problem that their chil-
dren would move away from Long Island, and that same percentage 
of residents thought they themselves would have to leave because of 
the high cost of living.370 
 
366 See supra, Part I.A. 
367 HOMSY, supra note 331, at 555. (Responding municipalities reported local government 
leadership as a factor 91 percent of the time). 
368 Stony Brook Center for Survey Research, Tracking Residential Satisfaction On Long 
Island, (2012) http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/surveys/ 
docs/Tracking%20Residential%20Satisfaction%202012.pdf. 
369 Id. 
370 Id. 
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Much of the literature on consolidation and regionalism opines 
about how consolidation is not politically viable.  And that lack of 
politically viability is, for the most part, an unchallenged premise 
taken as fact in new regionalist argumentation.371  But why then was 
Governor Cuomo—considered by many to be a savvy, calculating, 
adept, and quite careful politician372—so inclined to champion the 
Reorganization and Citizen Empowerment Act if it was so politically 
unpopular?  Take that a step further, and why would the Governor 
campaign on local government reform—specifically consolidation—
in television advertisements and headline grabbing quotes?373 
While we are not privy to Cuomo’s polling data, it is safe to say 
that his television advertisement “Castle” was vetted by his campaign 
staff and perhaps even tested in focus groups.374  And that the Gover-
nor only won fifty-four percent of the vote against a fairly weak Re-
publican opponent suggests he would have been disinclined to cam-
paign on an unpopular position.375 
Indeed, consolidation proposals overwhelmingly do not pass at 
the plebiscite stage.376  But one possible explanation for this variance 
between the Governor’s campaign platform and consolidation out-
comes is the monitoring cost.  In a gubernatorial election, the state’s 
highest office is being voted for and during a national midterm elec-
tion.  But local officials like Suozzi are elected during off cycle elec-
tions, and plebiscites are usually held during a special election, both 
more traditionally lower turnout affairs.  As the number of public of-
ficials who must be monitored (or putting it another way voted for) 
increases, only those stakeholders who have an “idiosyncratically 
high interest” will take necessary action—those most likely to benefit 
from the current regime such as employees of special districts.377 
 
371 See, e.g., Ostrow, supra note 278, at 187; Reynolds, supra note 309; Frug, supra note 
292, at 1787-88; Briffault, Localism And Regionalism, supra note 279, at 10-14; Swanstrom, 
supra note 306, at 492; Anderson, Dissolving Cities, supra note 35. 
372 See, e.g., Chris Smith, The Albany Machiavelli, N.Y. MAG (Apr. 14, 2013) 
http://nymag.com/news/features/andrew-cuomo-2013-4/(describing the Governor as having,  
among other traits, “unmatched political virtuosity). 
373 See supra Part I.D. 
374 See supra Part I.D; McKinley, supra note 162. 
375 Thomas Kaplan, ANDREW CUOMO IS RE-ELECTED NEW YORK GOVERNOR, BUT LOSES 
CLOUT, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2014) http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/nyregion/andrew-
cuomo-is-re-elected-governor-of-new-york.html?_r=0. 
376 See Anderson, supra note 35, 
http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/documents/121.5.anderson_appendices.pdf. 
377 Gillette, supra note 273, at 208. 
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The failed dissolution of Hempstead Sanitary District 2 illus-
trates the monitoring costs involved for plebiscites.  The district was 
one of the municipalities selected by Weitzman for audit in his 2007 
report on special districts.378  Out of the 21 sanitary districts audited, 
Sanitary District 2 had the third largest tax bill at $625.379  And with 
this enhanced scrutiny on the district, the Long Island Progressive 
Coalition and Residents for Efficient Special Districts seized the op-
portunity.  The groups combined with other local political leaders in 
gathering around 5,400 signatures and launching a full-fledged cam-
paign.  Even Newsday issued an endorsement for dissolution, further 
raising the referendum’s profile.380 
But ultimately the campaign for dissolution failed.  While the 
campaign collected over 5,000 signatures in favor of dissolution, the 
vote total yielded a starkly different number: “4,597 to keep the dis-
trict in place and 1,682 to dissolve it.”381  There are no apparent ex-
planations for the discrepancy.  In fact, the LIPC Communications 
Director seemed rather impressed by their vote total.382 
Monitoring costs could explain the stark difference between the 
signatures collected versus votes for. The monitoring costs in this 
case were lower for the petition stage, where voters merely had to 
sign at their own front door.  But voting for dissolution required the 
resident to participate in an off year and off cycle election, driving to 
the polls to express their preference.383 
Regardless of the explanation, plebiscites still stand as an in-
surmountable obstacle to consolidation that collaboration does not 
require.384 
 
378 Id. 
379 Weitzman, supra note 125, at 36 (Chart 19). 
380 Connolly, VOTE TO DISSOLVE SANITARY DISTRICT 2, Newsday (Dec 12, 2012 at 8:14PM) 
http://www.newsday.com/opinion/vote-to-dissolve-sanitary-district-2-editorial-1.4315821 
(“[T]he district is a bloated patronage pit, benefiting the politically connected with top sala-
ries, pension benefits and contracts. That's why supporters of eliminating it have had to bat-
tle every step of the way to even get the issue on the ballot.”). 
381 Chris Connolly, Sani2 to Stay, Long Island Herald (Dec. 20, 2012) 
http://liherald.com/baldwin/stories/Sani2-to-stay,45087. 
382 Id. (“Turnout was at least triple the mobilization you usually see, which means people 
are talking about these issues.”) 
383 Drew Desliver, Voter Turnout Always Drops Off for Midterm Elections, But Why?, 
Pew Research Center, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/07/24/voter-turnout-
always-drops-off-for-midterm-elections-but-why/. 
384 Id. 
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B. Incentive Programs Should Not be Solely Tethered 
to “Forced Efficiency” Policies in Order to Better 
Facilitate Efficiency and Equity Goals 
The property tax cap is likely to be a mainstay of New York’s 
fiscal policy. The law has a sunset date for June 2016, but from all 
reports, it is likely to be renewed this year due to the drafters linking 
it to New York City’s rent control law.385  Additionally, calls for re-
form of tax caps in California and Massachusetts and other states 
have not materialized into repeal of those laws.386  Professor Warn-
er’s survey indicates that municipalities have felt pressured to collab-
orate due to the property tax cap and property tax freeze.387  But teth-
ering collaborative centric programs to forced efficiency programs, 
like property tax caps, produces all or nothing stakes that can impede 
equity goals in tax policy.  Tethering collaborative focused tax credits 
to the cap appears intended to mitigate rent-seeking behavior of mu-
nicipalities that pierce the cap—municipalities seeking to alleviate 
the tax increase with state aid received for engaging in collaborative 
ventures.  But the tax freeze could achieve an equitable goal by con-
taining alternative criteria for collaborative focused tax credits.  This 
could allow low property assessments for municipalities that pierce 
the cap, in order to meet service delivery needs, to still benefit from 
tax incentives through collaboration.  Additionally, alternative crite-
ria options could also allow high-assessment municipalities that 
might be more likely to pierce the cap to still be incentivized to col-
laborate with low assessment ones. 
The prevailing assumption with the tax cap is that high-
assessment communities are more likely to pierce the cap to meet 
 
385 2011 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 97 (S. 5856) (McKinney).  The pertinent language reads: 
[T]his act shall remain in full force and effect at a minimum until and in-
cluding June 15, 2016 and shall remain in effect thereafter only so long 
as the public emergency requiring the regulation and control of residen-
tial rents and evictions and all such laws providing for such regulation 
and control continue as provided in subdivision 3 of section 1 of the lo-
cal emergency rent control act. . . . 
See also Rick Karlin, TAX CAP HAS SAVED AT LEAST $7.6 BILLION, SUPPORTERS SAY.com (May 
19, 2015 at 10:56PM) http://www.timesunion.com/news/article/Tax-cap-has-saved-at-least-7-
6-billion-6274588.php. 
386 See, e.g., David Crane, JERRY BROWN’S LAST CHANCE TO SAVE CALIFORNIA, Bloomberg 
Business, (May 20, 2013) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-19/jerry-
brown-s-last-chance-to-save-california.. 
387 See supra Part III B.2. 
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demands for a higher level of service delivery.388  However, poorer 
municipalities could still pierce the cap to meet necessary service de-
livery costs.389  These municipalities would not gain the benefit of a 
tax credit for submitting an efficiency plan under the property tax 
freeze program.390  Under this scenario, inequities for high concentra-
tion poverty communities are further compounded because the col-
laboration subsidy would be no longer available, but could still be 
used to achieve better service delivery and better economy of scale—
different from a rent-seeking motive. 
Tethering the collaborative focused incentives to the cap could 
also have the effect of disproportionately burdening low and middle-
income families in high assessment jurisdictions.  The property tax 
freeze was not the only tax credit program the Governor has sought to 
tether to the property tax cap.  In his 2015 proposed budget, the Gov-
ernor proposed a revised STAR circuit breaker, designed to alleviate 
property tax burdens for low and middle-income families.391  Howev-
er, the Governor also conditioned the tax credit received from the cir-
cuit breaker on the homeowner’s municipality staying within the 
property tax cap.392  Thus, those low and middle income families in 
jurisdictions that pierced the cap would not receive their credit.393  
This would also mean that low and middle income residents in high-
assessment communities, which may be more likely to pierce the cap 
for higher level of service, would not receive tax credits as well, cre-
ating an inequity between low and middle income residents across a 
region.394  This policy did not ultimately pass,395 but it shows a pat-
tern from the Governor’s office of how it would likely use the proper-
ty tax cap. 
 
388 See, e.g., MCMAHON, supra note 240. 
389 Id. 
390 Id. 
391 Fiscal Policy Institute, Summary of Selected Tax Provisions Final 2015-2016 Budget, 
http://fiscalpolicy.org/summary-of-selected-tax-provisions-nys-2015-2016-budget. (last vis-
ited (Apr. 14, 2015). 
392 Fiscal Policy Institute, Policy Brief: Proposed Tax Relief Will Assist Low and Middle 
Income Property Taxpayers, But Tweaks are Needed, http://fiscalpolicy.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/Property-Tax-Circuit-Breaker-Brief-3-5-2015.pdf. (last visited 
March 5, 2015). 
393 Id. 
394 Id. http://fiscalpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Property-Tax-Circuit-Breaker-
Brief-3-5-2015.pdf. 
395 New York State Senate, https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/john-j-
bonacic/bonacic-tax-cap-legislation-passes-senate (last visited April 13, 2016). 
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The property tax freeze, while not a circuit-breaker program, is 
still predicated on this year’s STAR qualification, which limits the 
tax credit for lower, middle, and upper-middle income families.396  
Thus, a similar inequity problem will occur where homeowners of 
low-assessment properties in nonetheless higher-assessment jurisdic-
tions do not gain the tax credit. 
Instead of tying collaborative centric forced efficiency pro-
grams only to staying within the cap, collaborative programs should 
be predicated on multiple alternative criteria points that take into ac-
count equitable considerations and incentivize sharing where need is 
greatest.  Professor Warner suggests equitable considerations for 
shared service policies can be achieved through a “differentiated state 
aid” model much like New York’s BOCES.397  New York State pro-
vides partial refunds in order to incentivize BOCES services through 
the greater of two formula calculations, one benefiting wealthier 
communities “with high assessments and low property tax rates,” and 
poorer school districts with “low assessments.”398  Professor Warner 
believes similar subsidy formulations can be translated for use by 
other municipal units.399 
And those municipalities that desire more services at a higher 
price should still be encouraged to collaborate with neighbors in or-
der to achieve economy of scale across the larger region.  While a 
collaborative tax credit for a high assessment municipality that pierc-
es the cap might appear to be a rent-seeking use of state resources, 
there is still a larger potential comparative advantage in having that 
municipality collaborate with others for overall reduction in the cost 
of services and economy of scale across the state, especially for low 
 
396 Fiscal Policy Institute, supra note 391. 
397 BINGXI QIAN & MILDRED WARNER, supra note 305, at 363. 
398 Cristopher Glenn Hayes, More than Career Education: A BOCES Primer, SHARED 
SERVICES (Dec. 2013), 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/mildredwarner.org/attachments/000/000/423/original/124313a5f2f
505667ba21c7c80246ef9. 
 [The] incentive aid is calculated by multiplying eligible expenses by the 
higher of two ratios, found in the New York State Aid Handbook: A 
millage ratio based on tax rate, with higher tax rates receiving less aid (1 
- .008/tax rate), or [a]n aid ratio based on total assessed value of district 
per student, with higher value per student districts receiving less aid (1 - 
.51*(Value/RWADA)/639,200), with a maximum of 90% and a mini-
mum of 36%. 
Id. 
399 BINGXI QIAN & MILDRED WARNER, supra note 305, at 363. 
64
Touro Law Review, Vol. 32 [2016], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol32/iss3/5
2016 300 Governments 599 
assessment municipalities where cost savings would benefit the most. 
While the property tax cap is surely a blunt force instrument, it 
does not need to be too blunt of a force. 
C. Grants Can Subsidize Transaction Costs 
The state’s Local Government Efficiency Grants program has 
lowered the barriers to collaboration by providing subsidies for the 
transaction costs associated with implementation. 
There are notable examples on Long Island.  In 2009, Nassau 
BOCES sought a $1 million comprehensive 21st Century Demonstra-
tion Project Grant to create a shared services platform for non-
instructional functions.400  This included cooperative purchasing, in-
formation technology, out-of-district transportation, internal auditing 
and future long-term planning.401  Nassau BOCES has touted mean-
ingful savings from the grant at a value of $9.5 million.402  The 
strides made in cooperative purchasing seemed to be quite robust.  As 
of 2012, Nassau BOCES has placed cooperative bids on various 
items, including utilities and professional services.403  In addition, 
BOCES has successful joint purchasing bids for natural gas, gasoline, 
and of course its joint purchase of paper with the Long Island Pur-
chasing Council.404  Nassau BOCES also explored opportunities for 
joint capital projects. 
Professor Mildred Warner at Cornell University has taken no-
tice of the potential to reduce school tax bills with backend services 
too.  A recent case study developed under her Restructuring Local 
 
400 Local Government Efficiency Program: Annual Report 2008-2009 11, NEW YORK 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, https://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/LGE_Annual_ 
Report_2009.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2016); See generally N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 54 
(McKinney 2013).. 
401 Local Government Efficiency Grant Program 32, NASSAU BOCES, 
http://www.nassauboces.org/cms/lib5/NY18000988/Centricity/Domain/56/Nassau21sCentur
yDemonstrationProjectApplication.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2016). 
402 Shared services grant saves the county millions, NASSAU BOCES, 
http://www.nassauboces.org/site/Default.aspx?PageType=3&DomainID=1213&PageID=643
5&ViewID=047e6be3-6d87-4130-8424-d8e4e9ed6c2a&FlexDataID=15147 (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2016) (“[T]he initiative has saved more than $550,000 in out-of-district transporta-
tion costs for school districts, $400,000 in mandated building condition surveys, $160,000 in 
IT and telecommunications services, $8 million in cooperative energy purchasing. . . [and] 
$400,000 in phone line redundancy removal . . .”). 
403 Cooperative Purchasing, NASSAU BOCES, http://www.nassausharedservices 
grant.org/index_files/page0005.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2015). 
404 Id. 
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Government Project analyzed some of the per year savings effects of 
Nassau BOCES’ grant project and resulted in findings of $900,000 in 
savings per year from joint cell phone plans and $240,000 per year 
from the redundant phone lines project.405  The study also identified 
other areas where increased collaboration could yield meaningful 
savings.406  Although recent reports have questioned certain purchas-
ing practices of BOCES,407 the overall success of the grant program 
and the resulting saved costs should not be looked over. 
The Local Government Efficiency Grants provide ancillary 
benefit to other municipalities as the state lists past Local Govern-
ment Efficiency Grant studies and reports on its website, providing 
models to other municipalities looking to enter into collaborative 
schemes.408  Municipalities can borrow assumptions and accounting 
figures when appropriate, and avoid problems other municipalities 
faced.  Prior studies were used by the Village of Farmingdale when, 
in 2008, it applied for a Local Government Efficiency Grant to study 
the feasibility of shared services between its district and the South 
Farmingdale Water District.409  In 2009, New York State approved 
the application and issued a $25,000 disbursement.410  With these 
new funds, the Village of Farmingdale contracted a local architectural 
and engineering firm, Holzmacher, McLendon & Murrell, P.C. 
(H2M), to prepare a study that the firm released in 2010.411  The firm 
analyzed both the Village of Farmingdale and the South Farmingdale 
Water District, looking at each governmental unit’s existing infra-
structure, the current and projected needs of the village and the water 
district, and possible alternatives to achieve cost reductions.412  In 
 
405 Christopher Glenn Hayes, INTERMUNICIPAL SHARING: BOCES HELPS TOWNS AND 
SCHOOLS COOPERATE ACROSS NEW YORK 3 (Dec. 2013) 
406 Id. 
407 See supra Part IV.A.1 
408 See generally Local Government Efficiency Studies & Reports, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES, 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/lge/Case_Studies.html (last updated Dec. 1, 2015). 
409 Regular Meeting of the Board of Trustees, VILLAGE OF FARMINGDALE (Nov. 3, 2008) 
http://www.farmingdalevillage.com/BOT%20minutes%2011-03-08%20Approved.pdf, 
410 Governor Paterson Announces More Than $2 Million In Local Government Efficiency 
Grants For Long Island, MEDIA-NEWSWIRE, http://media-
newswire.com/release_1094555.html. (last visited Apr. 14, 2016).  (Oct. 7, 2009). 
411 Shared Public Water Services Feasibility Study 1.1, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Jun. 
2010), 
https://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/LGEProjectReports/2008/Farmingdale_Report.pdf 
412 Id. 
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making its recommendations, H2M relied on past studies and reports 
available through the grant program, including an entire section in its 
analysis.413  Although the Village of Farmingdale ultimately did not 
pair up with any partners, the grant program allowed it to access the 
feasibility of its options without incurring additional costs. 
D. Local Government Training and Resources And 
Offices of Intermunicipal Coordination Can Help 
Reduce Information Asymmetries 
1. Local Government Training Resources 
Entering into intermunicipal agreements—although requiring 
significantly less intricacy than collaboration—still requires planning 
among local government officials.  But local officials often lack ex-
pertise in municipal government administration, especially upon arri-
val to office.  Because of this, New York State offers local govern-
ment training.  It produces literature on each process and lists best 
practices and strategies for successful planning.414  In 2009, Comp-
troller DiNapoli took training a step further by launching a “Local 
Government Leadership Institute” to help spur intermunicipal activity 
in the wake of the economic crisis and the passage of the Reorganiza-
tion and Empowerment Act.415 Teaming up with Hofstra University 
and Cornell University, the Comptroller put on a series of lectures 
across the state in an attempt to educate local officials on how to re-
duce costs through collaborative efforts with other municipalities.416  
 
413 Id. at 5.1. 
414 Local Government Training, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES, http://www.dos.ny.gov/LG/lut/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 
2016) (course listings for “Intermunicipal Agreements,” “Intermunicipal Planning,” “Finan-
cial Analysis of Shared Services and Intermunicipal Cooperation,” and “Smart Growth”); 
See generally DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIVISION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES , LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT HANDBOOK 9 (6th ed. 2009), 2011) 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/lg/publications/Local_Government_Handbook.pdf; INTERMUNICIPAL 
COOPERATION AND CONSOLIDATION, supra note 140, at 1; SHARED SERVICES IN LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT, supra note 140, at 1. 
415 Local Government Leadership Institute: Previous Institutes, OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK 
STATE COMPTROLLER, https://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/lgli/index.htm (last visited Apr. 
5, 14, 2016). 
416 Beyond the Fiscal Crisis: How to Build Partnerships and Leverage Opportunities 3, 
NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER (Aug. 13-14, 2009), 
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/lgli/pdf/cardi_finalreport.pdf; “Beyond the Fiscal Cri-
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And years later, with the advent of the property tax freeze, the state 
created new education sessions on ways local government officials 
can create compliant efficiency plans.417 
The state’s local government training initiatives serve practical 
education functions and lower information asymmetries inherent in 
collaboration.  According to Professor Warner, liability and risk con-
cerns, accountability, and state rules and regulations rank highest 
among local officials as obstacles to shared service agreements.418 
Further, the Comptroller sought to reduce information asymme-
tries through these programs as state officials fostered relationships 
with local government officials by having a face-to-face opportunity 
to better understand local government needs.419  These programs can 
also serve a dual purpose of local officials fostering relationships 
with each other.  Warner found that social networking among local 
officials promotes service sharing—another benefit to education ini-
tiatives.420 
Local government training sessions have been less frequent 
since the passage of the state’s major local government reform legis-
lation in 2009 and 2011.  But given the benefits derived from inter-
municipal subject programing, the Comptroller should again provide 
more frequent and consistent training sessions in order to facilitate a 
reduction in information asymmetries that allow local government 
leaders to build trust among one another. 
2. The North Hempstead Office of 
 
sis: How to Build Partnerships and Leverage Opportunities” 1, LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
LEADERSHIP INSTITUTE (Jun. 11, 2009), 
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/lgli/pdf/hofstra_whitepaper.pdf [hereinafter HOFSTRA 
LEADERSHIP SESSION]. 
417 Property Tax Freeze, OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER, 
https://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/realprop/taxfreeze.htm.  (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
418 A REFORM THAT WORKS, supra note 331, at 6 (“Liability/risk concerns” polled at 85 
percent, “[a]ccountability concerns in sharing arrangements” also polled at 85 percent, and 
[s]tate rules/legal regulations polled at 83 percent). 
419 HOFSTRA LEADERSHIP SESSION, supra note 416, at 7727.  The three “major goals” for 
the leadership institute were (1) “to build relationships among local government and school 
leaders and between officials on Long Island and New York State employees;” (2) “to im-
prove local government efficiency by presenting panels discussing best practices and key 
leadership skills, enabling leaders to learn from each other;” and (3) “to help the Comptrol-
ler’s Office understand ‘How we can help you, as local officials, develop the leadership 
principles that help you to deliver. . . .’” Id.; HOFSTRA LEADERSHIP SESSION, supra note 416, 
at 7. 
420 BINGXI QIAN & MILDRED WARNER, supra note 305, at 3. 
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Intermunicipal Coordination 
In 2006, the Town of North Hempstead, under the leadership of 
former Supervisor Jon Kaiman, created the Office of Intermunicipal 
Coordination (OIC).  The OIC appears to be the only one of its kind 
for a township in the country.421  The actual OIC is quite small: just 
one person.  But its current director, Rachel Brinn, talks to the town’s 
villages and special districts on an almost daily basis, finding out 
what their needs are and how the town can serve in assisting them.  
According to Nick Guariglia, Deputy Chief of Staff to the Town Su-
pervisor, having one firm source of contact is probably the most effi-
cient and productive model for increasing lines of communication 
and executing the office’s mandate.422  This is because if an inter-
municipal agreement is entered into, most of the work in drafting the 
deal is conducted by the town and village attorneys, along with other 
necessary technical experts. 
Over time, the OIC has slowly increased its portfolio.  In 2014 
alone, North Hempstead’s Town Board approved 13 intermunicipal 
agreements and entered into 11 of them.423  Additionally, the town is 
also looking at ways to increase cooperative purchasing.424  Accord-
ing to Guariglia, most cooperative purchasing agreements are initiat-
ed by phone conversations.  However, the OIC recently created an 
online client-relationship management system (CRM) for cooperative 
purchasing, and if activity were robust enough, it would supplement 
the current over-the-phone method.  Guariglia believes the OIC has 
helped the town towards achieving its homeowners’ property tax 
credit—gains that would be more difficult to achieve without it. 
The strategy of a larger municipality assigning a point person 
for collaborative ventures is a simple and cost effective way to reduce 
information asymmetries amongst its smaller governmental units. 
 
421 After multiple searches online I have not been able to find another office like the one 
in North Hempstead.  That said it is entirely possible that another office of intermunicipal 
coordination exists somewhere in the nation. 
422 Interview with Nick Guariglia, Deputy Chief of Staff to the Town Supervisor, 
423 See generally Supervisor Jon Kaiman Invited Guest at Meeting of the New York State 
Commission on Local Government Efficiency and Competitiveness, Town of North Hemp-
stead, http://www.northhempsteadny.gov/news/?FeedID=258&ShowDetailsDate=false (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
424 See generally Intermunicipal Agreements, TOWN OF NORTH HEMPSTEAD, 
http://www.oicnorthhempsteadny.net/IntermunicipalAgreements.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 
2016). 
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CONCLUSION 
Wood and Almendinger concluded 1400 Governments con-
cerned about two “burning issues”: (1) the case for municipal bank-
ruptcy while (2) the demand for services increases.425  Their discus-
sion was predicated on the notion that government in the 
Metropolitan Region was “hopelessly antiquated, narrow, inefficient, 
and inadequate,” and therefore unable to meet the demands of resi-
dents for the future.426  In particular, Wood and Almendinger cited 
Nassau County’s rapid increase in school expenditures, quoting one 
individual’s finding “that the tax burden on the real estate owner in 
Nassau County is greater and is increasing at a faster pace than the 
tax burden on the property owner in New York City.”427 
Of course, municipal bankruptcy hasn’t happened, and services 
provided by Nassau’s local governments have surely increased over 
time.  Nassau has not reached the “point of no return” on its tax sys-
tem’s capacity,428 but has seemingly looked to be at a crossroads for 
over half a century. 
Whatever Nassau’s solution is to its special district problem, it 
is clear that a wider reaching solution will be necessary, so long as its 
current financial position and cost of living fail to improve.  But the 
toolbox at the disposal of state and local government officials should 
be sufficient to achieve progress.  Collaboration is more practical 
than consolidation or dissolution in achieving the necessary change in 
the tax bill, and it creates more equitable service delivery across the 
county.  Additionally, the state’s current fiscal policy is helping to fa-
cilitate it too.  “Forced efficiency” with the property tax cap appears 
to be a new mainstay for local governments.  However, although it 
has made public officials more aware and more willing to engage in 
collaborative ventures, the state must be careful in how it further 
forces municipalities to collaborate, and it should make it a priority to 
tailor collaborative centric incentives around equitable goals.  Fur-
thermore, grants, education programs and offices of intermunicipal 
coordination (or just merely designated point people) are meaningful 
low cost tools that can help create more collaboration in the county. 
 
425 WOOD & ALMENDINGER, supra note 1, at 177-91. 
426 WOOD & ALMENDINGER, supra note 1, at 177-91. 
427 WOOD & ALMENDINGER, supra note 1, at 180 (citing SAMUEL F. THOMAS, NEW YORK 
CITY: ITS EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE PATTERNS 58-59 (1958)). 
428 WOOD & ALMENDINGER, supra note 1, at 181. 
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In all likelihood, Nassau’s “crazy quilt” is here to stay for better 
or for worse, but it doesn’t mean that collaborative strategies can’t be 
employed to solve the problem nor does it mean we can’t tailor those 
strategies that incentivize or force collaboration to achieve the effi-
cient, equitable and prosperous county we want—a county with good 
schools, new development, new and returning people, and a reasona-
ble cost of living along the way.  Collaboration can be an important 
part in making Nassau County the “ideal suburb” and one that its citi-
zens can whole-heartedly embrace. 
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